SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we hope
to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the more
interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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DISCRETION-State

FAMILY

LAW-CHILD

CUSTODY-NEW JERSEY COURTS POSSESS
ORIGINAL SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER INTERNATIONAL
CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES WHERE THE CHILD LIVED IN NEW
JERSEY WITHIN SIX MONTHS OF THE CHILD CUSTODY ACTION,
BUT NEW JERSEY COURTS MUST DETERMINE WHETHER A MORE
CONVENIENT FORUM EXISTS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, WHEN A CHILD AND HER FAMILY HAVE
SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN TIES-valdi v. Ivaldi, 147 N.J. 190, 685

A.2d 1319 (1996).
In 1990, plaintiff, Jean Jacques Marcel Ivaldi (the father) and
defendant, Lamia Khribeche Ivaldi (the mother), met in Switzerland
during the course of studying restaurant and hotel management. See
Ivaldi v. Ivaldi, 147 N.J. 190, 194, 685 A.2d 1319, 1321 (1996). The
parties were married on September 18, 1992, in Rabat, Morocco.
Thereafter, the parties lived in France. On June 21, 1993, the parties'
daughter, Lina, was born in France.
The parties are not in agreement as to the subsequent facts. The
mother claims that the family moved to Rabat, Morocco in October 1993,
and that Lina resided in Morocco until the family moved to New Jersey
in late January 1994. The father argues that prior to the family moving
to New Jersey in January 1994, Lina visited, but did not live in,
Morocco.
After the family moved to New Jersey to live near the father's
parents, the parties' marriage began to deteriorate.
The parties
separated, and the father moved into his parents' residence in Flanders,
Morris County, New Jersey. With the assistance of counsel, both parties
entered into a separation agreement on February 22, 1995.
The
agreement provided that the parents would have joint legal custody of
Lina, but that the mother would retain physical custody of her daughter.
Of particular note, the agreement explicitly permits the mother to leave
the United States with Lina and reside elsewhere, provided that she
adheres to the pertinent terms of the agreement.
The agreement states that: (1) the father is entitled to twelve weeks
of visitation annually; (2) the mother must allow Lina to visit her father
in the country in which he lives; (3) New Jersey law is the governing
law; and (4) the terms of the agreement will become a part of any
subsequent divorce agreement. See id. at 195, 685 A.2d at 1321. The
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agreement does not, however, dictate which jurisdiction will preside over
the forthcoming matrimonial action, in which permanent custody of Lina
will be at issue.
At the end of February 1995, shortly after the parties signed the
separation agreement, the mother sent Lina to Morocco to reside with the
mother's parents. The mother moved to Morocco a few weeks later, and
on April 27, 1995, instituted an action for divorce and custody of Lina in
the Primary Court of Rabat in Morocco. See id., 685 A.2d at 1322.
Meanwhile, on May 2, 1995, the father instituted an action in the New
Jersey Superior Court, requesting, inter alia, sole custody of Lina. See
id. Soon after receiving service of process from the father notifying her
of the proceedings in superior court, the mother filed a motion to dismiss
the superior court action. See id.
The superior court denied the motion to dismiss. See id. The court
held that the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:34-29 to 52 (the Act), does not apply to international child custody
disputes. See id. Seemingly contrary to its decision that the Act does
not apply, the court determined that New Jersey was Lina's "home state"
under the meaning of the Act and, therefore, the court had jurisdiction to
resolve the custody dispute. See id. The court further opined that the
mother had sent Lina to Morocco by "subterfuge," and was holding Lina
"hostage" in Morocco. See id. at 195, 196, 685 A.2d at 1322. The
court's order required the mother to bring Lina back to New Jersey
within a week, awarded the father temporary sole custody, and restrained
the mother's custody proceedings in Morocco. See id.at 195, 685 A.2d
at 1322.
The appellate division granted the mother a temporary stay and
asked that the superior court provide a written explanation of the reasons
for its decision. See id. In its written opinion, the superior court
explained that the Act was inapplicable because the court in Morocco had
yet to enter a custody order. See id. In addition, the superior court
propounded that the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction (Hague Convention on Child Abduction)
did not apply because Morocco had not yet signed the child abduction
aspects of the Convention. See id. at 195-96, 685 A.2d at 1322. The
superior court further commented that New Jersey was Lina's "home
state" because, as of the date on which Lina left New Jersey, she had
lived more than one-half of her life thus far in the state. See id. at 196,
685 A.2d at 1322.
The appellate division allowed the mother leave to appeal and
extended the stay of the superior court order. See id. The appellate
division reversed the decision of the lower court on March 15, 1996. See
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id. The appellate court disagreed with the superior court judge's
conclusion that the mother had used "subterfuge" to remove, or had
wrongfully removed, the child from the United States. See id. On the
contrary, the appellate division found that the separation agreement
"clearly contemplated" that the mother would take Lina outside of the
United States to live elsewhere. See id. The appellate division also took
issue with the superior court judge's finding that the mother had denied
the father his visitation rights with Lina. See id. The appellate division
determined that the father had not been entitled to visit with Lina because
the father had failed to offer travel expenses for Lina, a precondition to
his visitation, until April 17, 1995. See id.
The appellate division concluded that the superior court should have
dismissed the action because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. See id.
The appellate division agreed with the superior court that the Act was
inapplicable to an international child custody dispute. See id. at 196-97,
685 A.2d at 1322. In the opinion of the appellate division, the Act only
applied to jurisdictional questions between the courts of different states,
not to international jurisdictional conflicts. See id. The appellate
division declared that despite the fact that a section of the Act specifically
addresses international custody disputes, that section bestows jurisdiction
on New Jersey courts only when those courts are requested to enforce a
foreign custody decree. See id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-51
(West 1996)). The appellate division also declined to extend subject
matter jurisdiction under the Hague Convention on Child Abduction and
the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act. See id. In conclusion, the
appellate division noted that even if the New Jersey court had subject
matter jurisdiction over the instant action, "principles of international
comity" required that the superior court give deference to the court in
Morocco. See id. at 197, 685 A.2d at 1323. The appellate division was
confident that the Moroccan courts could provide an adequate forum for
resolution of the custody dispute pursuant to the best interests of the
child. See id.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted the father's petition for
certification. See id. at 193, 685 A.2d at 1321 (citing Ivaldi v. Ivaldi,
145 N.J. 372, 678 A.2d 713 (1996)). The court held that the term
"state" within the meaning of the Act includes foreign countries, and
thus extends jurisdiction over international custody disputes to New
Jersey courts. See id. at 202-03, 685 A.2d at 1325. The court further
concluded that the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction because
New Jersey was Lina's "home state" within the meaning of the Act. See
id. at 203-04, 685 A.2d at 1326. Finally, however, the court remanded
the case to the superior court for a determination of whether New Jersey
or Morocco would provide the most convenient forum for resolution of
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the custody dispute. See id. at 204-05, 685 A.2d at 1326.
Justice Pollock, writing for a unanimous court, began the opinion by
examining the relevant language of the Act to determine whether the Act
applies to custody disputes where one party is a resident of a foreign
country. See id. at 197-203, 685 A.2d at 1323-25. While the express
language of the Act defines "state" as "any state, territory, or possession
of the United States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the District
of Columbia," and suggests that the Act applies only to jurisdictional
disputes between state courts, Justice Pollock noted that the New Jersey
statute extends the "general policies of [the Act] to the international
area." Id. at 198, 685 A.2d at 1323 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:3451 (West 1996)). As a result, the court opined that the Act applies to
foreign countries as well. See id.
The justice clarified the court's findings, stating that the central
jurisdictional policy of the Act is to assure that litigation of custody
disputes occurs in the "state" where the family and the child have the
See id. Hypothesizing, the justice
most significant connections.
emphasized that New Jersey could very well be the most convenient
"state" even in the situation, like the present, where one parent or one
parent and the child reside in a foreign country. See id.
Next, Justice Pollock attacked the appellate division's reliance on
Schmidt v. Schmidt and Roszkowski v. Roszkowska. See id. at 198-99,
685 A.2d at 1323 (citing Schmidt v. Schmidt, 227 N.J. Super. 528, 548
A.2d 195 (App. Div. 1988); Roszkowski v. Roszkowska, 274 N.J. Super.
620, 644 A.2d 1150 (Ch. Div. 1993)). Justice Pollock distinguished
Schmidt, noting that unlike the case at bar, Schmidt involved the portion
of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-51 that permits New Jersey courts to
recognize foreign custody decrees. See id. at 199, 685 A.2d at 1323-24.
Justice Pollock recounted the Schmidt court's statement that "[the Act]
applies only to an international custody case when the [s]tate is asked to
Id.
recognize and enforce custody decrees of foreign countries."
(quoting Schmidt, 227 N.J. Super. at 533, 548 A.2d at 198). The justice
observed that because the Schmidt case did not present the issue of
original subject matter jurisdiction over an international child custody
dispute pursuant to the Act, the statement as to subject matter jurisdiction
was simply dicta. See id. at 199-200, 685 A.2d at 1324.
In turn, Justice Pollock declared that the Roszkowski court's reliance
on the statement in Schmidt was too restrictive. See id. at 199, 685 A.2d
at 1324. Justice Pollock also reiterated the Roszkowski court's decision
that the Act did not vest a New Jersey court with original jurisdiction
over a child custody dispute where the child was removed to Poland. See
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The justice continued by disagreeing with the appellate division's
different treatment of original subject matter jurisdiction and the
enforcement of foreign custody decrees. See id. at 200, 685 A.2d at
1324. Justice Pollock pronounced that the language of the Act suggests
that New Jersey courts possess both original subject matter jurisdiction
over international custody disputes and the power to enforce foreign
custody decrees. See id. Specifically, Justice Pollock pointed to N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-51, which extends the general policies of the Act to
the international domain, and states that the provision in the Act
demanding that New Jersey courts acknowledge and enforce custody
orders of other states applies to custody decisions of courts of other
nations, provided that "reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard"
was afforded to all parties. Id.
To further bolster the position that the Act extends original subject
matter jurisdiction to international custody disputes, Justice Pollock
emphasized the increasing trend toward global trade, communication, and
travel as reasons why international boundaries will no longer present the
same obstacles for people of different nations to develop relationships and
marry. See id. Recognizing that marriages sometimes end in divorce,
Justice Pollock noted that international child custody disputes will, and
have, become an increasing event. See id. As a result, Justice Pollock
predicted that state courts frequently will be forced to entertain custody
actions where the parties are citizens of different countries. See id.
Justice Pollock stated that in some instances during those disputes, the
courts of other countries may be more convenient for a custody dispute,
even if New Jersey courts question the validity of the process provided in
a foreign jurisdiction. See id. at 200-01, 685 A.2d at 1324.
The justice then noted that in interpreting the language of the Act, a
majority of the other states have held that the term "state" includes
foreign nations. See id. at 201-02, 685 A.2d at 1325. Of particular
importance, the justice remarked, is that all of the courts of these other
jurisdictions have so held despite statutory language defining a " state " as
"any state, territory, possession of the United States, the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia." Id. Justice Pollock
explained that in Missouri and Ohio, the two states that have held that
"state" does not include a foreign country, the state legislatures have
excluded the equivalent of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-51 from their
versions of the Act. See id. at 202, 685 A.2d at 1325. Justice Pollock
opined that the absence of the provision extending the application of the
Act to the international arena is critical. See id. For the foregoing
reasons, the court concluded that the Act applies to international child
custody disputes. See id. at 203, 685 A.2d at 1325.
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After the court -determined that the term "state" includes foreign
nations, Justice Pollock focused on the question of whether the superior
court had subject matter jurisdiction under the Act. See id., 685 A.2d at
1326. The court observed that New Jersey was Lina's "home state,"
under the meaning of the Act, at commencement of the father's
proceedings. See id. Justice Pollock explained the definition of "home
state," as provided in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-30(e), as "the state
where the child lived with one or both parents at least six months before
the custody suit began."
Id. Applying that definition, the justice
commented that Lina had lived with both of her parents in New Jersey
for approximately thirteen months, significantly longer than the six
months required by the Act. See id. In addition, Justice Pollock
reiterated that Lina left New Jersey only two months prior to the father
instituting the present action, and thus resided in New Jersey within six
months prior to the custody dispute. See id. As a result of her recent
extended residence in New Jersey, Justice Pollock concluded that New
Jersey is Lina's "home state" and that the superior court had subject
matter jurisdiction. See id. at 204, 685 A.2d at 1326.
The justice enunciated, however, that this did not resolve the
jurisdictional issue. See id. Justice Pollock explained that the remaining
issue to be determined was whether New Jersey is the most convenient
forum, or whether Lina and her family have closer ties with Morocco.
See id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-29(c) (West 1996)). The court
acknowledged that the appellate division had addressed the mother's
argument for dismissal on the grounds of forum non conveniens. See id.
The justice disagreed, however, with the appellate division's application
of the doctrine of international comity to resolve the forum non
conveniens issue. See id. Justice Pollock elaborated that the more
appropriate standard is provided in the Act, and thus remanded the case
for a proper factual investigation pursuant to the Act. See id. The
justice stated that the Act requires a state court to consider whether it is
in the interests of the child to have the issue litigated in a more
convenient forum. See id. at 204-05, 685 A.2d at 1326. (citing N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-35(c) (West 1996)). To provide guidance to the
lower court, Justice Pollock detailed a number of factors that are primary
to deciding what is in the best interests of the child. See id. Of
particular note to the inquiry, the justice explained, were Lina's
significant ties to Morocco. See id. at 205, 685 A.2d at 1326-27.
Justice Pollock further encouraged the lower court to communicate
with the Moroccan court to gather the facts relevant for its decision. See
id., 685 A.2d at 1327. The justice highlighted that even if the superior
court were to dismiss the action, that court would not be estopped from
subsequently reviewing whether the Moroccan judgment is enforceable.
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See id. Justice Pollock proclaimed that if, for instance, the procedural
protections provided by the court in Morocco were deficient, the superior
court could refuse to enforce the judgment. See id. The court then
discussed the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law,
Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation In Respect of Parental
Responsibility and Measures For the Protection of Children, and cited
language that supported the Act's "best interests of the child" test for the
most convenient forum. See id. at 206-07, 685 A.2d at 1327-28.
Justice Pollock concluded his opinion by affirming the court's
confidence in the competency of the Moroccan courts, and pronounced
that even if the action were transferred to Morocco, New Jersey law
would still apply pursuant to the separation agreement. See id. at 207,
685 A.2d at 1328. In summary, the justice proclaimed that in reaching a
decision, the goal of the court was to avoid jurisdictional conflicts
without endorsing parental decisions to move children outside the United
States in order to obtain a different forum for a custody dispute. See id.
Justice Pollock's opinion strikes a proper balance between asserting
New Jersey's jurisdictional power under the Act and giving proper
deference to foreign courts. While the justice firmly established New
Jersey's position in international child custody disputes, the justice
provided the courts with significant flexibility to defer to foreign
jurisdictions where significant foreign ties exist. In addition, Justice
Pollock's holding protects New Jersey's interest in preventing parents
from removing children from New Jersey to avoid the reach of the New
Jersey courts. Finally, by centering the forum non conveniens inquiry
around the "best interests of the child" test, Justice Pollock ensured that
New Jersey judges will not focus on jurisdictional struggles and lose
sight of what is best for the child.
David C. Berry

CRIMINAL LAW-JURY VERDICTS- INCONSISTENT JURY VERDICT IS
REVIEWABLE WHEN IT IS THE RESULT OF MISLEADING JURY
INSTRUCTIONS-State v. Grey, 147 N.J. 4, 685 A.2d 923 (1996).

In late March 1992, cocaine was stolen from defendant, Roosevelt
Grey, a drug dealer. See State v. Grey, 147 N.J. 4, 6, 685 A.2d 923,
923 (1996). The defendant immediately suspected that Jessie Bellinger
had taken the drugs because Bellinger knew where defendant had hidden
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the drugs. See id., 685 A.2d at 924. The defendant informed his
Jenkins also suspected
supplier, Marvin Jenkins, about the theft.
Bellinger of stealing the drugs, and Jenkins instructed defendant to
Jenkins also threatened to burn down
threaten Bellinger's family.
Bellinger's house.
Defendant then accompanied Jenkins to fill a container with gas and
later to a boarded-up house, where he believed Bellinger was staying.
Defendant kept watch, and observed Jenkins enter Bellinger's house with
the gas container. See id. at 6-7, 685 A.2d at 924. After Jenkins left the
house, defendant viewed a cloud of smoke coming from the house. See
id. at 7, 685 A.2d at 924. Although three people died in the fire,
Bellinger was not at home at the time his house burned down.
Jenkins and Grey were each charged with one count of seconddegree aggravated arson, one count of second-degree conspiracy to
commit aggravated arson, one count of third-degree terrorist threats, and
three counts of murder. See id. at 8, 685 A.2d at 924. The two men
were tried separately. See id. Subsequently, a jury convicted the
defendant of conspiracy to commit aggravated arson and three counts of
felony murder, but did not convict him of second-degree aggravated
arson, the predicate offense for felony murder. See id., 685 A.2d at 92425.
The defendant moved to set aside the felony murder convictions on
the ground that the verdicts were inconsistent because defendant was
convicted of felony murder without a conviction of the predicate felony
of aggravated arson. See id., 685 A.2d at 925. The State contended that
the incongruous verdicts resulted from the trial court's confusing charge,
which implied that defendant could be found guilty of aggravated arson
only if defendant acted as a principal. See id. Regardless, the State
argued, New Jersey courts allow juries to submit inconsistent verdicts.
See id. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced defendant. See
id.
Finding that consistent jury verdicts are not required under New
Jersey law, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, upheld
defendant's felony murder convictions. See id. at 9, 685 A.2d at 925.
Furthermore, the appellate division found that a reasonable jury could
have decided that defendant aided Jenkins in setting the fire and was
therefore culpable for felony murder as an accomplice, but may have
refrained from convicting Grey of arson based on compromise, mistake,
or lenity. See id. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification
and reversed the decision of the appellate division. See id. The majority
held that an inconsistent jury verdict is reviewable when it is the result of
misleading jury instructions. See id. at 12, 17, 695 A.2d 927, 929.
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Justice O'Hern, writing for the majority, began the court's analysis
by noting the federal standard with respect to inconsistent jury
instructions. See id. at 9-10, 685 A.2d at 925. Specifically, the majority
explained that in Dunn v. United States and United States v. Powell, the
United States Supreme Court held that inconsistent jury verdicts do not
necessarily indicate that a jury is not convinced of the defendant's
culpability, but rather, may indicate that the verdict is the result of
leniency or nullification. See id. (citing United States v. Powell, 469
U.S. 57 (1984); Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932)). Although
acknowledging that the Dunn/Powell rule is not binding on New Jersey
state courts, the court nonetheless adopted the principle that inconsistent
jury verdicts are acceptable. See id. at 10, 685 A.2d at 925.
Additionally, Justice O'Hern emphasized that New Jersey case law
has embraced the Dunn/Powell rule. See id., 685 A.2d at 925-26. The
court noted that inconsistent jury instructions are usually acceptable
because the jury ideally represents 'the conscience of the community,'
and 'of society as a whole."' Id., 685 A.2d at 926 (quoting State v.
Ingenito, 87 N.J. 204, 211-12, 432 A.2d 912, 916 (1981)). Moreover,
the majority commented that as long as a conviction is grounded on
sufficient evidence, inconsistent jury verdicts are usually permissible.
See id.
The court reiterated that the Dunn/Powell rule permitting
inconsistent jury verdicts was the law in New Jersey, in light of federal
and state law. See id. at 11, 685 A.2d at 926. The majority emphasized,
however, that the Dunn/Powell rule is only applicable when the basis for
the inconsistent verdicts cannot be determined. See id. Declaring that
misleading jury instructions undoubtedly led to the inconsistent verdict in
the instant case, the court held that the Dunn/Powell rule was not
applicable because the origin of the inconsistency was determinable. See
id. at 12, 685 A.2d at 927.
In reaching this determination, Justice O'Hern remarked that
conspiracy to commit arson was not a predicate crime for felony murder.
See id. at 15, 685 A.2d at 928. The court explained that the trial court
failed to instruct the jury in a clear manner that an individual could be
found guilty of aggravated arson merely as an accomplice and not solely
as a principal. See id. The jury must have acquitted defendant of the
arson charge, the justice reasoned, because he was not the principal. See
id. Also, noting that the trial court failed to inform the jury that
defendant could not be convicted of felony murder without being guilty
of the predicate crime of aggravated arson, Justice O'Hern proffered that
the jury did not understand that conspiracy was not a predicate crime for
felony murder. See id. Accordingly, the court concluded that these
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misleading jury instructions led to a verdict not permitted under New
Jersey law. See id.
Next, the justice commented that this is the first case in which the
court was asked to uphold a conviction of felony murder where the
defendant was acquitted of the predicate felony. See id. at 16, 685 A.2d
at 929. The court opined that the Dunn/Powell rule does not apply where
a trial error is at issue. See id. Justice O'Hern therefore held that "this
case is not about speculation as to the reasons for the inconsistent verdict,
but, rather, about a misleading charge that led to a verdict not permitted
under our law" and reversed the appellate court's decision. Id. at 17,
685 A.2d at 929-30.
Justice Coleman, concurring in part and dissenting in part, sharply
criticized the majority's "speculation" approach. See id. at 18, 685 A.2d
at 930 (Coleman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Accusing
the court of merely guessing at the jury's thought process, the dissent
found that the majority's holding was neither grounded in fact nor law.
See id. Moreover, Justice Coleman accused the majority of 'acting as
some sort of super-rescue mission."'
Id. (quoting Whitfield v.
Blackwood, 101 N.J. 500, 501, 502 A.2d 1132, 1132 (1986) (Clifford,
J., concurring)).
The dissent asserted the majority's conclusion that the felony
murder conviction was based on conspiracy to commit aggravated arson
as the predicate offense was unfounded. See id. at 19, 695 A.2d at 930
(Coleman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The justice
remarked that the jury was not instructed that it could find the defendant
guilty of felony murder based on conspiracy. See id. Justice Coleman
therefore found no reason to believe that the jury used conspiracy as the
predicate offense giving rise to the defendant's felony murder conviction.
See id.
Moreover, with respect to the trial court's instructions pertaining to
accomplice liability, the dissent commented that although the jury was
instructed on the role of the principal in committing arson, the jury was
also properly instructed regarding accomplice liability. See id. at 20, 685
A.2d at 931 (Coleman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Coleman opined that there was no factual basis for the conclusion
that the jury did not follow these instructions. See id. at 21, 695 A.2d at
931 (Coleman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Noting that
defendant admitted his culpability in assisting Jenkins in the arson,
Justice Coleman concluded that it was reasonable for a jury to find that
the defendant had aided the arson as an accomplice.
See id.
Acknowledging that the verdict was inconsistent, the dissent found the
factual scenario at issue to be idiosyncratic and did not justify permitting
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a guilty man to go free. See id.
Additionally, Justice Coleman reiterated that the Dunn/Powell
standard should govern. See id. at 22, 695 A.2d at 932 (Coleman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Based on the Dunn/Powell
rule, Justice Coleman concluded that an inconsistent jury verdict should
be unreviewable if the inconsistency is based on "mistake, compromise,
lenity, or some unspecified error." Id. at 25, 685 A.2d at 932 (Coleman,
Next, the dissent
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
articulated that the Dunn/Powell rule contained a procedural safeguard to
protect defendants against improper verdicts-the "sufficiency-of-theevidence" standard. See id. at 27, 695 A.2d at 935 (Coleman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). According to this standard,
Justice Coleman argued, an inconsistent jury verdict should be permitted
so long as it is supported by sufficient evidence. See id. (citing Powell,
469 U.S. at 67).
Noting that many New Jersey cases have addressed the issue of
inconsistent jury verdicts, Justice Coleman stressed that New Jersey long
ago adopted the Dunn/Powell standard. See id. Tracing the history of
New Jersey's application of the Dunn/Powell rule, the dissent emphasized
that most of these cases addressed the issue in dicta because the verdicts
See id. at 28-29, 685 A.2d at 936
were found to be consistent.
(Coleman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Specifically,
Justice Coleman noted that the application of the Dunn/Powell rule in this
case is in accordance with the supreme court's most recent
pronouncement on the issue. See id. at 36, 685 A.2d at 940 (Coleman,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing State v. Petties, 139
N.J. 310, 654 A.2d 979 (1995)).
The dissent next surveyed cases from other jurisdictions applying
See id. at 37-38, 685 A.2d at 940-41
the Dunn/Powell standard.
(Coleman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The justice
denounced the majority's "speculation" approach by explaining that
every jurisdiction, including the minority of states that reject the
Dunn/Powell standard, have insulated inconsistent jury verdicts from
reviewability in cases of felony murder. See id. The dissent then
emphasized that the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard adequately
See id. at 39, 685 A.2d at 941
guards against jury irrationality.
(Coleman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Rejecting the
majority's use of speculation as to how the jury reached its verdict in this
case, Justice Coleman stated that this "approach is not only bad law, but
contrary to the court's teachings" to avoid second-guessing about jury
verdicts. Id. at 40, 685 A.2d at 942 (Coleman, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). In conclusion, Justice Coleman reiterated that the
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Dunn/Powell standard is the law in New Jersey, that there are no
exceptions to the rule, and that the decision of the appellate division
should have been upheld. See id. at 40-41, 695 A.2d at 942 (Coleman,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The majority's opinion is flawed for several reasons. First, in
failing to apply the Dunn/Powell rule, the court in effect has rejected the
long-standing federal and New Jersey doctrine that made inconsistent jury
verdicts unreviewable. Additionally, permitting the reviewability of
inconsistent jury verdicts based on misleading jury instructions displaces
the sacred role of the jury as the finder of fact in criminal cases. Finally,
it was unnecessary for the majority to carve out a broad exception to the
Dunn/Powell rule, permitting review of inconsistent jury verdicts based
on misleading jury instructions, because the facts of this case were
narrow and anomalous. In Grey, there appeared to have been a trial
error; furthermore, a conviction of three charges of felony murder is a
severe penalty. Even the majority admitted that the instant case was
idiosyncratic and that the court had never before encountered a conviction
of felony murder where the defendant had been acquitted of the predicate
felony. The miscarriage of justice this exception creates is even more
disturbing when coupled with the fact that, as the dissent correctly
pointed out, an admitted felon and murderer will not receive the
punishment he rightfully deserves. Accordingly, both the appellate
division and the dissent were correct in refusing to carve out an exception
to the long-standing rule that inconsistent jury verdicts are unreviewable.
Michelle M. Bufano

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT--RETAINER

AGREEMENTS-SIX-MONTH

NOTICE-OF-TERMINATION
PROVISION
CONTAINED
WITHIN A
RETAINER AGREEMENT Is EXCESSIVE AND UNDULY BURDENS A
CLIENT'S RIGHT TO DISCHARGE AN ATTORNEY, BUT INFORMED
CLIENTS MAY LIMIT THIS RIGHT PROVIDED THE PROVISION IS
REASONABLE AND FAIR-Cohen v. Radio-Electronics Officers

Union, 146 N.J. 140, 679 A.2d 1188 (1996).
Plaintiff, Ernest Allen Cohen, an attorney specializing in labor and
employment law, is licensed to practice law in New Jersey, New York,
and Arizona. See Cohen v. Radio-Electronics Officers Union, 146 N.J.
140, 145, 679 A.2d 1188, 1191 (1996).
Beginning in 1964 and
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continuing until December 1987, Cohen served as a partner at the New
York law firm of Marchi, Jaffe, Cohen, Crystal, Rosner & Katz
(Marchi). See id. at 146, 679 A.2d at 1191. As of December 1987,
Cohen assumed of-counsel status at Marchi.
Defendant, RadioElectronics Officers Union (ROU), a labor organization comprised of
approximately 200 members, represents the interests of radio officers
responsible for communications aboard seagoing ocean vessels. From
1975 to 1980, Marchi acted as the ROU's general counsel. The plaintiff
was the partner responsible for the work performed for the ROU.
In 1980, the ROU experienced a change in leadership. As a result,
Marchi was discharged and replaced by the firm of Dickstein, Shapiro &
Morin. In December 1985, Thomas C. Harper was elected to the
position of secretary-treasurer for the ROU. After his election, Harper
asked Cohen to return as general counsel for the ROU. On January 4,
1986, the ROU and Marchi signed a retainer agreement that provided for
an hourly rate not to exceed $150. In June of that year, the ROU elected
Harper president.
The relationship between the ROU and Marchi continued without
change until March 1987 when Cohen decided to change his career path.
He planned to move to Arizona, develop a solo practice in that state, and
teach at the University of Arizona College of Law as an adjunct
professor. He also intended, however, to remain of-counsel with Marchi.
On April 27, 1987, plaintiff first discussed these plans with Harper. At
this meeting, the parties negotiated the terms of an agreement
(Agreement) retaining Cohen as general counsel. See id. at 146-47, 679
A.2d at 1191. In exchange for a reduction in the rate Cohen charged per
hour, from $150 to $100, Harper agreed to a provision requiring the
ROU to afford Cohen six-months notice in advance of the Agreement's
termination. See id. at 147, 679 A.2d at 1191. Cohen's reasons for
seeking this notice were two-fold. First, Cohen, as a solo practitioner,
would require time to obtain additional clients to supplement the loss of
the ROU retainer if terminated on short or no notice. Second, the
University of Arizona needed notification in June of Cohen's intentions
to become a full-time professor the following year. The two mutually
exclusive options contemplated by plaintiff were becoming a full-time
faculty member and representing the ROU.
Harper's objective in
agreeing to the provision was simply to minimize the ROU's legal
expenses.
Once the essential points of the Agreement were reached, Harper
requested that Cohen prepare a proposed contract. At trial, plaintiff
testified that he encouraged Harper to confer with independent counsel
regarding the substance of the contract. The following day, Harper
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presented the contract to the District Executive Committee (DEC), the
ROU's governing body. Later that day, Harper, as authorized agent for
the ROU, signed the Agreement. See id., 679 A.2d at 1192. The DEC
endorsed the Agreement in either April or May of that year. See id. at
147-48, 679 A.2d at 1192.
The Agreement retained Cohen as general counsel for the ROU for
one year. See id. at 148, 679 A.2d at 1192. Effective January 1, 1988,
the Agreement provided for "annual compensation of $100,000 for 1,000
This fee was to be paid monthly at a rate of
hours of service."
$8333.33. For each hour of service in excess of 1000 hours, the plaintiff
was to be compensated at a rate of $150 per hour. Furthermore, the
Agreement stipulated that Cohen was to serve as co-counsel to the ROU
Plans and Trusts, separate entities that provide benefits to company
employees and ROU members. Any compensation received by Cohen
while acting in this capacity entitled the ROU "to additional hours of
The
services at the rate of (1) hour per $100 of compensation."
Agreement also placed certain demands upon the plaintiff concerning his
availability in the event that the ROU required his services. Finally, the
Agreement was to be automatically renewed unless the party wishing to
terminate provided written notification of termination between six and
seven months after the anniversary date of January 1. See id. at 149, 679
A.2d at 1192.
In December 1987, plaintiff moved to Arizona, and as of January 1,
1988, began working pursuant to the terms of the Agreement. Cohen
performed 550 hours of legal service for the ROU in 1988. Effective
January 1, 1989, the Agreement automatically renewed without objection
from either party. In 1989, Cohen rendered 1003 hours of service for
the labor organization. This work represented over 50% of the plaintiffs
professional time during this two-year period.
As the result of an antagonistic relationship that had developed
between Cohen and C.E. DeFries, the president of the ROU's parent
union, the National Marine Engineers Beneficial Association (NMEBA),
Harper began to view the plaintiff as an obstacle impeding his aspirations
of becoming the executive secretary of the NMEBA. On November 16,
1989, Harper sent ballots to the DEC seeking authorization to renegotiate
or terminate the ROU's contract with plaintiff. See id., 679 A.2d at
1192-93. Some time later, Harper contacted David Tipton, the auditor
for the ROU Plans and Trusts (Plans), to examine plaintiff's contract and
bills. See id., 679 A.2d at 1193. On December 10, 1989, claiming that
Cohen had double-billed the ROU for work performed for the Plans,
Harper informed plaintiff by letter that he was being replaced as cocounsel. See id. at 149-50, 679 A.2d at 1193. Later, on December 28,
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1989, plaintiff received written notice of his discharge as general counsel
for the ROU. See id. at 150, 679 A.2d at 1193. Both the law and
appellate divisions found the stated reason for termination to be a pretext.
See id. at 149, 679 A.2d at 1193.
Except for the three hours of work that exceeded the 1000 hour
threshold, Marchi fully compensated Cohen for the services performed by
him during 1988 and 1989. See id. at 150, 679 A.2d at 1193. In
addition, Cohen held $8079 of ROU funds in an attorney's special
account. This amount had been awarded to the ROU as attorney's fees
stemming from an arbitration dispute in which the ROU had been
represented by Marchi. The sum had been received by plaintiff on behalf
of the ROU. Previously, the ROU had paid the firm from other funds,
and had allowed Cohen to retain the money in return for credit against
any additional fees incurred by the ROU in the future.
Claiming that the Agreement had been automatically renewed as a
result of the ROU's failure to comply with the notice-of-termination
provision, plaintiff demanded payment of $100,000. The ROU refused
and Cohen initiated the present action requesting damages of $100,000
under the Agreement for 1990 and an additional $75,000 for fees
reasonably anticipated from the ROU Plans and Trusts.
Contending that plaintiff had failed to advise the ROU to consult
with independent counsel, that the Agreement contained unlawful and
unreasonably advantageous provisions, that the Rules of Professional
Conduct prohibited a suit stemming from an attorney's discharge, and
that the Agreement was terminated for cause, the ROU argued that the
Furthermore, the ROU filed a
Agreement was unenforceable.
counterclaim for misrepresentation, malpractice, and breach of contract.
The law division held that the Agreement was reasonable and fair.
See id. The court found the plaintiff more credible than Harper, and
stated that the Agreement resulted from the efforts of capable negotiators
who utilized leverage and made concessions to attain certain objectives.
See id. at 150-51, 679 A.2d at 1193. In addition, the trial court
determined that the ROU's reason for discharging Cohen was pretextual,
the true reason being that Harper sought the support of DeFries for his
candidacy to the NMEBA. See id. at 151, 679 A.2d at 1193.
The court found that the availability requirement of the retainer
agreement prevented Cohen from accepting a full-time position and that
this in turn was compensable. See id. Focusing on the unique facts
presented in this case, the trial court held that the Agreement's notice
provision was not unreasonable or oppressive, and that Rule 1. 16(d) of
the Rules of Professional Conduct, which precludes liability for
contractual fee obligations arising from an attorney's discharge, does not
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apply in this instance. See id., 679 A.2d at 1193-94. The court also
declared that the provision crediting the ROU with one hour of service
for every $100 billed for work done for the plans was illegal and
therefore unenforceable. See id. at 152, 679 A.2d at 1194. Finding the
clause severable, however, the court held that the Agreement remained
enforceable. See id.
Awarding Cohen $50,000 in damages under the Agreement for
1990, the trial court reasoned that Cohen had a duty to mitigate, and by
June 1990, he could have accepted a full-time teaching position or
developed his practice by obtaining other clients. See id. The court also
awarded Cohen $450 for the three hours of uncompensated service
rendered in 1989. See id. Calculating, however, that the ROU was
entitled to reimbursement for work performed by plaintiff for the plans in
the amount of $37,486, and that plaintiff was to return the $8079 retained
by him, the court entered a final judgment against defendant in the
amount of $4885. See id.
Reversing the trial court, a divided New Jersey Superior Court,
Appellate Division, held that the Agreement was unenforceable and that
the lengthy notice provision unreasonably burdened the ROU's right to
discharge its attorney.
See id. at 145, 679 A.2d at 1191.
Acknowledging that non-refundable retainer arrangements are "not
unethical per se," the appellate division asserted that such agreements
must be fair and reasonable to the client to be upheld. See id. at 152,
679 A.2d at 1194. The appellate court stated that an attorney is entitled
to quantum meruit, the reasonable value of his services, and not an
amount specified in an agreement. See id.
Concluding that the Agreement impermissibly chilled the ROU's
right to discharge plaintiff, the appellate division relied on the "modern
rule" regarding contingent fee agreements, which stipulates that a client
retains the right to discharge an attorney without cause and for any
reason, and that this right is implied in every contract entered into by an
attorney and a client. See id. at 153, 679 A.2d at 1194. The court
opined that the attorney-client relationship is unique in nature, and that a
provision allowing an attorney to recover fees for which legal services
have not been rendered is in contravention of public policy and ethical
considerations of the profession. See id., 679 A.2d at 1194-95. A
client, the court stated, cannot be held liable for damages arising from the
exercise of this inherent right. See id., 679 A.2d at 1194. The court
entered judgment for the ROU in the amount of $7629, which
represented the $8079 retained by Cohen less the uncompensated three
hours of legal service. See id. at 154, 679 A.2d at 1195.
Modifying and affirming the judgment of the appellate division, a
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majority of the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the six-months
notice-of-termination provision contained in the Agreement excessively
burdened the client's right to discharge its attorney. See id. at 159-60,
161, 165, 679 A.2d at 1198, 1199, 1200. The majority also announced
that the three-days notice given to plaintiff was both unreasonable and
unfair, entitling plaintiff to one additional month's compensation. See id.
Writing for the majority, Justice Pollock began by stressing that it is
the exclusive responsibility of the court to regulate attorney conduct in all
facets of the attorney-client relationship and to preserve the fiduciary
responsibility that attorneys owe their clients. See id. at 155, 679 A.2d
at 1195. The court cautioned that the contractual freedom enjoyed by an
attorney and his client is not absolute, but is confined by notions of
professional ethics and fairness.
See id., 679 A.2d at 1196.
Acknowledging that attorney-client agreements are generally enforceable,
Justice Pollock pointed out that such agreements are invalid if they do not
comply with the ethical rules controlling the relationship. See id. at 15556, 679 A.2d at 1196.
The burden of proving the fairness and
reasonableness of an attorney-client agreement, the court stated, rests
with the attorney. See id. at 156, 679 A.2d at 1196. Explaining that
these agreements are to be construed against the attorney, the justice
emphasized that the attorney bears the fiduciary obligation to inform his
client regarding the scope of representation, the implications of the
arrangement, the possibility of conflicts, and the basis and rate of fees.
See id. Justice Pollock warned that a retainer arrangement may not
inhibit a client's rights nor provide for unreasonable fees. See id.
Recognizing that a client maintains the right to discharge his
attorney without cause and in abrogation of any existing agreement
between them, the majority noted that a sophisticated client may agree to
compensate his attorney in the event of termination by the client,
provided that the provision does not chill his right to terminate. See id.
at 157, 679 A.2d at 1196. Focusing on the facts presented, the court
deferred to the trial court's determinations of credibility and findings of
fact that Cohen was believed to be the more credible witness, and that
Harper and the ROU ably negotiated the Agreement through the prism of
experience and sophistication. See id. at 157-58, 679 A.2d at 1197.
Justice Pollock further observed that the ROU had agreed to pay plaintiff
for his availability, as supported by the facts that the ROU had paid
Cohen the full amount of the retainer for slightly more than half the
anticipated hours of legal service in 1988, and that the Agreement was
renewed for the following year. See id. at 158, 679 A.2d at 1197.
Continuing, the justice reiterated that the focus of the court's
inquiry was whether the Agreement's notice-of-termination provision was

856

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[27:839

invalid. See id. Agreeing with the appellate division, the majority found
the provision requiring six-months notice of discharge to be excessive
and unduly burdensome on the ROU's right to dismiss plaintiff. See id.
at 159-60, 679 A.2d at 1198. Announcing it a matter of public policy,
Justice Pollock reiterated that retainer agreements may not impose
unreasonable restraints on the unfettered right of clients to discharge their
attorneys. See id. at 160, 679 A.2d at 1198. The court recognized,
however, that some clients, particularly those experienced in retaining
lawyers, negotiate agreements that effectively inhibit the right of
termination in exchange for reduced fees. See id. The justice declared
that these arrangements would not be proscribed, especially in this
climate of concern regarding the price of legal services. See id.
Justice Pollock next addressed the circumstances surrounding the
formation of the retainer agreement. See id. Noting that a reasonable
retainer fee may account for the costs of the availability of attorneys and
the opportunities that they forgoe, the court posited that the conditions in
which an agreement was made are relevant to determine the extent to
which an agreement will be construed against the attorney. See id. at
160-61, 679 A.2d at 1198. Pertinent to this analysis, the court opined,
are the past practices of the parties, the intensity of the negotiations, and
the client's sophistication and experience in hiring and compensating
attorneys. See id. at 160, 679 A.2d at 1198. The justice concluded that
the notice provision included in the Agreement was the product of
bargaining between experienced negotiators who sought to exchange a
reduction in fees and availability on demand for a lengthy notice of
discharge. See id. at 161, 679 A.2d at 1198.
Interpreting this concession, the majority determined that the ROU
had effectively agreed to reasonably compensate Cohen for the right to
end their relationship. See id. In light of this understanding, the court
found that the three-days notice given to the plaintiff was unfair and
unreasonable. See id., 679 A.2d at 1199. Justice Pollock declared that a
client may limit his right to discharge an attorney by agreeing to extend
reasonable notice of termination. See id. Reiterating that this limitation
may be especially appropriate when the client is experienced in dealing
with attorneys, the justice cautioned that even with sophisticated clients,
the contractual limitation must be reasonable, fair, and not unduly
burdensome on the client's right to discharge. See id. at 161-62, 679
A.2d at 1199. Justice Pollock noted that this right could be encumbered
by a provision requiring the client to pay excessive fees if it dismisses the
attorney without reasonable notice. See id. at 162, 679 A.2d at 1199.
The court emphasized that an attorney should advise his client to consult
with independent counsel regarding the agreement and, at a minimum,
inform his client of the significance of restricting the right to terminate
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the relationship. See id.
Turning to the issue of damages, the majority concurred with the
appellate division's adoption of the "modern rule." See id. at 164, 679
A.2d at 1200. Recognizing that some jurisdictions apply the "contract
rule," which allows for damages under the contract when a client
discharges an attorney without cause, Justice Pollock asserted that by
compensating an attorney for services performed, the "modern rule"
assures adequate and fair compensation to an attorney, protects a client's
right to discharge, and preserves the fiduciary character of the attorneyclient relationship. See id. Observing that the parties intended for the
ROU to reasonably compensate Cohen if it discontinued their affiliation
contrary to the Agreement, the court postulated that the fair value of the
plaintiff's services included the price of reasonable notice of discharge in
addition to Cohen's annual retainer. See id. at 165, 679 A.2d at 1200.
The justice concluded that one-month notice represented reasonable
notice, and that its fair value was the agreed-upon $8333.33 monthly
payment. See id. The court affirmed the net set-off of $7629 arrived at
by the appellate division, and entered judgment as modified. See id., 679
A.2d at 1200-01.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Stein, joined by
Justice Coleman, criticized the majority's determination that plaintiff was
entitled to one month worth of fees because the ROU terminated the
Agreement without adequate notice. See id., 679 A.2d at 1201 (Stein, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The justice, agreeing with the
appellate division, announced that the unreasonableness of the notification
provision rendered the Agreement unenforceable as a matter of law. See
id. at 165-66, 679 A.2d at 1201 (Stein, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Declaring that the clause unreasonably advanced the
plaintiff's interests by placing an unjustifiable restraint on the ROU's
right to discharge, the justice asserted that a damage award for the
plaintiff was therefore inappropriate. See id. at 166, 679 A.2d at 1201
(Stein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Recognizing that
extraordinary circumstances may support a provision compensating an
attorney if the client ended the relationship prematurely, Justice Stein
opined that the facts of this case did not present such a situation. See id.
Justice Stein disagreed with the majority's inference that the parties
intended to provide Cohen with reasonable compensation in the event the
ROU discharged him prematurely. See id. at 170, 679 A.2d at 1203
(Stein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In the justice's
view, the majority incorrectly reformed the Agreement by substituting a
reasonable notice-of-termination clause for one that was exceptionally
unreasonable and unfair. See id. Illustrating the unfairness of the notice
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provision, Justice Stein observed that, if the ROU chose to discharge
Cohen and replace him immediately without affording him the required
six months' notice, plaintiff would potentially be entitled to up to
eighteen months compensation for legal services never conferred. See id.
Noting that plaintiff failed to produce any evidence supporting his
contention that his obligations to the ROU prevented him from
developing his practice or from accepting a full-time faculty position, the
justice declared that the provision unduly promoted Cohen's own
interests to the detriment of his client's interests. See id. at 170-71, 679
A.2d at 1203-04 (Stein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Accordingly, Justice Stein found the benefit conferred upon Cohen to be
unwarranted. See id. at 170, 679 A.2d at 1203 (Stein, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
Agreeing with the majority, the justice concurred that the notice-oftermination provision contravenes public policy and that an attorney is
entitled to the reasonable value of the legal services he provided. See id.
at 171, 679 A.2d at 1204 (Stein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Stein chastised the majority, however, for construing the
reasonable value of plaintiff's services to embrace the cost of reasonable
notification. See id. The justice challenged the court's holding, positing
that the majority improperly applied a rule utilized for enforcing
restrictive covenants contained in employment contracts. See id. A
court, the justice posited, may choose to enforce a restrictive covenant to
an extent reasonable under the circumstances presented. See id. Justice
Stein noted that this form of modification is appropriate only in a
commercial setting, and has been specifically proscribed by the court in
agreements for legal services that violate public policy. See id. at 17172, 679 A.2d at 1204 (Stein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
In closing, the justice admonished the majority for reforming the
Agreement and for rewarding an attorney who placed personal interests
before his responsibilities to his client. See id. at 172, 679 A.2d at 1204
(Stein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stein
reminded the court of its obligation to invalidate retainer agreements
whose terms are so unreasonable as to constitute a violation of public
policy. See id. An attorney who unfairly secures an advantage over his
client, the justice opined, injures the profession, and such conduct must
be strictly disfavored by the court. See id.
With its decision in Cohen, the New Jersey Supreme Court has
protected the right of an attorney to bargain freely with an experienced
client to the extent that the resulting agreement is reasonable and fair.
The court has reconciled the interest of contractual autonomy and the

SURVEY

1997]

fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship to actively preserve the
former while not sacrificing the latter. Although the right to choose
satisfactory representation remains of paramount importance, by
distinguishing between situations in which the client is naive to attorneyclient relationships and those in which he is not, the court has recognized
that the inequities that may arise, if the parties' intentions are not
fulfilled, could result in injustice.
Where attorneys negotiate for
innovative fee agreements with clients who consult independent counsel
concerning the significance of the arrangement, the possibility for abuse
is virtually non-existent. Failure to acknowledge the intentions of the
parties at the time of formation shackles attorneys by inhibiting their
ability to structure their businesses to fit certain professional needs.
Through the application of a reasonableness standard, the court has
ensured that any transgressions will be corrected, and it has retained the
power to examine the circumstances underlying such agreements on a
case-by-case basis.
Anthony M. Gruppuso

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL-FEDERAL AGENCY DETERMINATIONSAN
INDIVIDUAL
WHO
HAS
RECEIVED
AN
ADVERSE
ADMINISTRATIVE

DETERMINATION

FROM

THE

UNITED

STATES

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION ON A CHARGE OF
NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION

UNDER TITLE

VII Is NOT

THEREAFTER PRECLUDED FROM FILING A CLAIM UNDER THE NEW
JERSEY LAW AGAINST

DISCRIMINATION

BASED ON THE SAME

FACTS IN STATE SUPERIOR COURT-Hernandez

v. Region Nine

Hous. Corp., 146 N.J. 645, 684 A.2d 1385 (1996).
Region Nine Housing Corporation/New Brunswick UAW Associates
(Region Nine) employed plaintiff Wilfredo Hernandez, an American
citizen of Hispanic descent, as a maintenance worker beginning in
February 1991. See Hernandez v. Region Nine Hous. Corp., 146 N.J.
645, 650, 684 A.2d 1385, 1387 (1996). On July 30, 1991, claiming to
be acting in response to complaints from apartment residents about
workers speaking Spanish in public areas of the building, Region Nine
suspended, with pay, Hernandez and three other individuals of Hispanic
origin for two days for engaging in such behavior in the lobby of the
building where they worked. As a condition of returning to work,
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Region Nine required Hernandez to submit a letter evidencing positive
acknowledgment of the terms and conditions of his job. Region Nine
reinstated Hernandez and stressed that he was not to speak Spanish in the
common areas of the building while working. See id., 684 A.2d at 138788.
On October 28, 1991, Region Nine fired Hernandez for
unsatisfactory job performance. See id., 684 A.2d at 1388.
Thereafter, on November 4, 1991, Hernandez submitted a complaint
to the New Jersey Division of Civil Rights (DCR), claiming that his
suspension and discharge were unlawfully grounded upon his national
origin. On February 26, 1992, Hernandez also filed charges with the
United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
claiming that he was suspended and fired in contravention of Title VII of
the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). On June 4, 1992, prior
to the initiation of any further action by the DCR, Hernandez voluntarily
rescinded his complaint from the state's civil rights division. See id. at
651, 684 A.2d at 1388.
Hernandez's complaint continued to move forward before the
EEOC, and on May 19, 1993, following an investigation, the agency
issued a determination letter. The EEOC concluded that Region Nine's
requirement that only English be spoken by its employees during work
hours was discriminatory and contravened Title VII, because such a
policy could not be upheld as a business necessity. The EEOC found,
however, that Region Nine fired Hernandez for poor work performance
pursuant to company policy, and that there was no reasonable cause to
conclude that he was terminated for discriminatory reasons. The EEOC,
on January 21, 1994, provided Hernandez with a notice of right to sue,
which stated that Hernandez had ninety days following receipt by him of
the notice to initiate suit in federal district court. If Hernandez did not
file suit within the stated time period, he was thereafter barred from
bringing suit under Title VII in the federal district court.
Instead of filing in district court, Hernandez brought claims against
Region Nine and its regional manager, Joan Wilk, in the New Jersey
Superior Court, Law Division, asserting that his suspension and
termination violated New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination (LAD).
See id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-1 to -42 (West 1993)). In
response to a subsequent motion by Region Nine, the trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of Region Nine based on its finding that
Hernandez's complaint was precluded by the earlier EEOC adverse
determination. See id. The appellate division agreed and affirmed. See
id. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted Hernandez's petition for
certification. See id. (citing Hernandez v. Region Nine Hous. Corp., 144
N.J. 377, 676 A.2d 1092 (1996)).
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Justice Handler, writing for a unanimous court, began the court's
opinion by providing the general purposes behind both the LAD and Title
VII. See id. at 651-52, 661, 684 A.2d at 1388, 1393. The justice
acknowledged that the LAD demonstrates New Jersey's forceful public
policy to combat almost every recognized form of discrimination. See id.
at 651, 684 A.2d at 1388 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3). Justice
Handler noted that on previous occasions, the court had stated that the
LAD's ultimate goal was complete eradication of discrimination. See id.
at 651-52, 684 A.2d at 1388.
To best effectuate this result while
providing the greatest protection to those needing it the most, the justice
asserted that the legislature has instructed employers and the legal
community to interpret the LAD in an expansive and liberal manner. See
id. at 652, 684 A.2d at 1388.
The court announced that Title VII also aims to eliminate
discrimination, but on a national basis. See id. Justice Handler, while
observing the similar goals of the two provisions, was quick to note that
Title VII was fashioned "to supplement, rather than supplant, existing
laws" prohibiting discrimination in the workplace.
Id. (quoting
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49 (1974)). The
justice remarked that Congress specifically intended for an aggrieved
party to be able to pursue independently a Title VII suit and a suit
pursuant to applicable state statute. See id. (quoting Alexander, 415 U.S.
at 48-49). The court further commented that state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with federal courts over Title VII suits. See id.
Justice Handler next distinguished the state and federal statutory
schemes. See id., 684 A.2d at 1388-89. Justice Handler explained that
the LAD presents a complainant with a number of remedial options to
rectify instances of alleged discrimination. See id., 684 A.2d at 1388.
The justice articulated that individuals may choose to file a complaint in
either an administrative forum, by submitting a complaint with the DCR,
or in a judicial forum, by filing suit directly in the superior court. See
id., 684 A.2d at 1389 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-13). The court
noted that these remedial schemes are complementary, but also mutually
exclusive. See id. Justice Handler further explained that the LAD
enables the director of the DCR to use expansive remedial power to
rectify instances of unlawful discrimination in complaints submitted to
the division. See id. at 653, 684 A.2d at 1389. The court averred that
injunctive relief and incidental monetary relief, through compensatory
damages, are available in DCR proceedings in addition to damages for
pain and suffering or humiliation. See id. The justice concluded by
acknowledging that the court has remedial power similar to that of the
DCR and also has the authority to award compensatory and punitive
damages in such cases. See id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3).
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Continuing, Justice Handler initiated a detailed discussion of Title
VII's remedial scheme. See id. Unlike the LAD, the justice proffered,
Title VII fails to provide a choice between an administrative and a
judicial remedial path.
See id. The only option available for a
complaining employee in a Title VII action, the court asserted, is to file
charges of discriminatory conduct with the EEOC. See id. at 653-54,
684 A.2d at 1389. Justice Handler explained that initially a direct suit in
a federal district court is not available, but, rather, the aggrieved party
must await either the EEOC determination or the passing of 180 days
before the complainant is presented with notice of the right to sue in
federal court. See id. The court stated that upon receipt of such notice,
plaintiff has ninety days to formally institute suit in a district court. See
id. at 654, 684 A.2d at 1389.
Justice Handler declared that this
administrative-remedy exhaustion requirement constitutes an essential
component of Title VII's remedial scheme because it initially presents
only the EEOC with the authority to investigate discriminatory conduct
in the workplace, and allows the EEOC to carry out its statutory function
of procuring voluntary compliance and promoting accommodating efforts.
See id.
Justice Handler commented that the Code of Federal Regulations
lists the powers conferred upon the EEOC to investigate allegations of
discriminatory conduct. See id. The justice further stated that the EEOC
may choose to research the complainant's charges and may mandate that
the complainant submit to the agency a statement describing the allegedly
illegal practices and the harm suffered by the complainant. See id. The
EEOC, the court recognized, is also empowered to hold a fact-finding
session with the parties to specify the issues involved and determine
whether a foundation exists for a negotiated settlement of the claim. See
id., 684 A.2d at 1390. Additionally, the court noted that the EEOC may
issue subpoenas and call witnesses. See id. Justice Handler emphasized
that complainants in these proceedings do not have the right to a
formalized hearing before the agency, and the EEOC lacks the authority
to devise remedies or enforce its decisions. See id.
Justice Handler noted that a complainant retains the right to sue
without regard to the EEOC's determination as to the existence of
reasonable cause to support the charges of discrimination. See id. The
court declared that the consequences of a finding of reasonable cause are
that the EEOC may subsequently attempt to either procure voluntary
compliance by the employer, achieve an amenable agreement between the
parties, or initiate suit itself against the offending employer. See id. at
655, 684 A.2d at 1390. The justice further asserted that although the
EEOC is capable, on its own initiative, of reconsidering its decisions,
parties lack the absolute right to appeal an agency determination. See id.
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Justice Handler stressed that the complainant retains the ability to initiate
a de novo trial in the federal district court based on the underlying Title
VII charge, regardless of the EEOC's conclusion as to the existence of
reasonable cause supporting the employment discrimination allegations.
See id. The justice recognized that EEOC decisions are typically
admissible at subsequent trials, absent a demonstration that a particular
finding is especially untrustworthy. See id. Justice Handler insisted,
however, that district courts possess the discretion to ignore EEOC
decisions if these courts conclude that the danger of unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs the probative value of the EEOC reports. See id.
The court further explained that when a court admits an EEOC
determination at trial, it holds no precedential value. See id.
Next, Justice Handler returned to the LAD and stated that under this
remedial path, a complainant must choose to proceed in either the
superior court or the DCR. See id. at 656, 684 A.2d at 1390. The court
proffered that a "final determination" in either of these two forums
precludes the complainant from initiating any additional action, civil or
criminal, founded upon the same grievance. See id. Justice Handler
concluded by explaining that a plaintiff is allowed to change forums only
prior to the rendering of a final determination. See id.
The justice then discussed the appellate division's decision and
commented that the lower court saw plaintiff's lawsuit as an effort to
change forums subsequent to an adverse administrative ruling. See id.,
684 A.2d at 1391. The court restated the appellate division's holding
that plaintiff, pursuant to state law, should be precluded from initiating
his LAD claim in a state forum after the EEOC rendered an adverse
administrative determination. See id. Disagreeing with the appellate
court's holding, Justice Handler opined that the-preclusive language of
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-27, relied upon by the lower court, did not
mandate the result reached by that court. See id. Justice Handler
referred to an earlier explanation by the New Jersey Supreme Court that
the consequences of decisions from the appropriate federal and state
agencies are significantly different. See id. The court reiterated that
DCR decisions are expressly given final, preclusive, and enforceable
status under state law. See id. at 656-57, 684 A.2d at 1391. In contrast,
Justice Handler emphasized that EEOC determinations are expressly
categorized by federal statute as non-final and non-binding. See id. at
657, 684 A.2d at 1391.
The justice continued by noting that an
unfavorable EEOC decision does not disallow a complainant from
initiating a Title VII claim in either state or federal court, but, rather, is
only a prerequisite to the filing of a discrimination claim under Title VII.
See id.
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Justice Handler continued with a discussion of the relevant case law
specifically relied upon by the appellate division. See id. The court first
attacked the appellate division's treatment of Hermann v. Fairleigh
Dickinson University as controlling. See id. (citing Hermann v. Fairleigh
Dickinson Univ., 183 N.J. Super. 500, 444 A.2d 614 (App. Div. 1982)).
Justice Handler explained that in Hermann, the plaintiff filed a LAD
claim with the DCR, which determined that the complaint lacked merit;
therefore, the DCR issued a final determination of no probable cause
supporting the complaint. See id. The justice recounted that plaintiff
then initiated suit on an identical claim in the law division, which
ultimately dismissed the suit. See id. Justice Handler stated that the
appellate division affirmed the lower court's holding based on an
interpretation of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-27, which declares that a final
DCR decision precludes further action in the law division founded upon
the same set of facts. See id. The court distinguished Hermann,
however, because in Hernandez's case, there was an absence of a
determination on the merits by the DCR. See id. Therefore, Justice
Handler concluded that the preclusive language of N.J. STAT. ANN. §
10:5-27 was inapplicable. See id.
Justice Handler further opined that a similar analysis of Pittman v.
LaFontaine, also referred to in the appellate division's decision, failed to
support the lower court's conclusion in the instant case because the DCR
had not issued a decision. See id. (citing Pittman v. LaFontaine, 756 F.
Supp. 834, 844 (D.N.J. 1991)). The justice briefly outlined the facts of
Pittman, where a plaintiff's federal Title VII suit could not proceed due
to a previous adverse administrative decision by the DCR. See id.
Justice Handler observed that the district court engaged in a full-faithand-credit analysis to weigh the impact of the DCR determination on
plaintiff's case. See id. The court noted that the district court found the
DCR proceedings to have. complied with due process and also to have
preclusive effect under state law. See id. Therefore, Justice Handler
elaborated, the district court concluded that the nonfavorable
determination was to be given full-faith-and-credit, and thus dismissed
plaintiff's suit. See id.
Additionally, Justice Handler remarked that Aldrich v. Manpower
Temporary Services failed to substantiate the appellate division's decision
in the present case. See id. (citing Aldrich v. Manpower Temp. Serv.,
277 N.J. Super. 500, 504-05, 650 A.2d 4, 6 (Law Div. 1994)). In
Aldrich, the court recognized, plaintiff was permitted to file suit in the
law division after removing her complaint from the DCR prior to the
entering of a determination. See id. Justice Handler explained that the
Aldrich court rejected defendant's proffered argument that the plaintiffs
first choice of an administrative forum must bar her from initiating suit in
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the law division under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-27. See id. at 657-58,
684 A.2d at 1391. The court reiterated the law division's holding that
"[i]t is the finality in the forum selected that raises the bar," not the
initial forum selection. Id. at 658, 684 A.2d at 1391. Justice Handler
commented that because no final decision had been made by the DCR,
Aldrich was permitted to withdraw her DCR claim and then bring suit in
the law division. See id. Justice Handler recognized that the appellate
court distinguished Hernandez's claims from Aldrich's on the basis that
Hernandez had been given an unfavorable agency determination, whereas
Aldrich abandoned her DCR claim prior to the issuance of a decision.
See id. The court determined that this distinction was not material. See
id.
Justice Handler found that the appellate division incorrectly
characterized the EEOC determination as a final order, when plaintiff
never actually received a final decision on his federal claim. See id.
Therefore, Justice Handler asserted, plaintiff was entitled under federal
law to institute suit in federal district court. See id.
The justice summarily explained that Title VII does not allow for an
election of remedies, but, rather, expressly serves as a complement to
state anti-discrimination laws and cannot serve as a bar to instituting a
LAD claim. See id., 684 A.2d at 1391-92. Hernandez, Justice Handler
emphasized, needed to file charges with the EEOC first, which then
would permit litigation of his Title VII claim. See id. The court noted
that plaintiff did not elect to settle his claims through an exclusive
administrative procedure. See id., 684 A.2d at 1392. The justice stated
that plaintiffs commonly join LAD and Title VII claims in federal court
actions. See id. Justice Handler concluded that N.J. STAT. ANN. §
10:5-27 does not prevent this action. See id.
Justice Handler stressed, however, that the EEOC decision, despite
its lack of finality or enforceability, was still legally significant. See id.
The court asserted that the admissibility of the EEOC determination in
later district court litigation suggested that collateral estoppel may arise
in deciding whether the adverse EEOC determination foreclosed the
litigation of any subsequent LAD claims. See id. at 658-59, 684 A.2d at
1392. Justice Handler noted that New Jersey tribunals adhere to the
doctrine of collateral estoppel as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments (Restatement). See id. at 659, 684 A.2d at 1392. The justice
explained that for the doctrine to be applicable, thus rendering a prior
determination to be conclusive in a subsequent suit between the parties,
the Restatement requires that an issue of fact or law must have been
actually adjudicated and decided by a valid and final judgment. See id.
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982)). New
Jersey law, the court added, mandates that the issue to be given
preclusive effect must be identical to the issue presented in the
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subsequent action. See id. (citing Morristown Trust Co. v. Thebaud, 43
N.J. Super. 209, 217, 128 A.2d 288, 293 (Ch. Div. 1957)).
The court declared that the Restatement also includes instances when
collateral estoppel is unavailable. See id. First, Justice Handler asserted,
when review of the initial action's judgment is unavailable to the party
against whom preclusion is desired, collateral estoppel is inapplicable.

See id. at 659-60, 684 A.2d at 1392 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
§ 27 (1982)). Second, the court presented, when a new
decision of the issue is required due to disparities in the quality or
thoroughness of the procedures adhered to in the two forums or by
factors concerning the allocation of jurisdiction between them, collateral
estoppel is improper. See id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982)). Third, the justice stated, collateral estoppel is
also unavailable when a clear and convincing reason exists for a new
determination due to the possible adverse effect of the decision on the
public interest, or even on those persons who are not involved in the
OF JUDGMENTS

initial action. See id. (quoting

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§ 27 (1982)). Justice Handler recognized that administrative agency
determinations can preclude litigation in a subsequent trial only if
initially rendered in proceedings that deserve such deference. See id. at
660, 684 A.2d at 1392-93. The justice opined that EEOC determinations
cannot preclude issues brought about by plaintiff's LAD claims in state
court. See id., 684 A.2d at 1393. The court reiterated that EEOC
decisions are not final judgments. See id. Justice Handler also observed
that review of the EEOC decision was unavailable to plaintiff because no
See id.
appeal lies for this federal agency's determinations.
Additionally, the court determined, collateral estoppel was not proper
because significant differences were present in the quality and
thoroughness of the proceedings adhered to by the EEOC, as compared
to those followed by the law division. See id. at 660-61, 684 A.2d at
In conclusion, Justice Handler held that an adverse EEOC
1393.
decision did not collaterally estop a plaintiff from initiating an
employment discrimination suit under the LAD in state court. See id. at
661, 684 A.2d at 1393.
Justice Handler also reversed the appellate division's holding that
the entire controversy doctrine barred plaintiff's suit. See id. The justice
asserted that the purpose behind the entire controversy doctrine is the
encouragement of quick and efficient disposition of all claims in a single
proceeding before a single forum. See id. Justice Handler focused on a
statement previously made by the appellate division that explained the
importance of equality of forum, as required by the entire controversy
doctrine. See id. (quoting Perry v. Tuzzio, 288 N.J. Super. 223, 230,
672 A.2d 213, 216 (App. Div. 1996)). The court found that no equality
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of forum existed between the EEOC proceedings and those that occur in
the superior court. See id. The court noted that a more extensive and
structured litigation opportunity was available in the superior court. See
id. Justice Handler once again restated that the EEOC is.incapable of
rendering a final, enforceable judgment. See id. Therefore, despite the
fact that plaintiff did not submit his LAD claim to the EEOC, the court
held that the entire-controversy doctrine was not a bar to plaintiff's LAD
claim. See id. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the
appellate division. See id.
The unanimity of the court's opinion clearly conveys the
obviousness and necessity of the inapplicability of any preclusive effect
of EEOC determinations in subsequent state court proceedings. Issues of
employment discrimination admittedly are important to the federal
government, but are also extremely important to state governments.
State legislatures are not precluded from providing to their citizens
greater protection from discriminatory employment practices than that
furnished by the federal government. New Jersey has decided to afford
its citizens this increased protection through its LAD. This additional
armor should not be frustrated by federal agency determinations guided
by the less protective shield of Title VII. The combined application of
both Title VII and the LAD working as intended as complements, and not
replacements, as recognized by the court, quite properly provides the
victim of discriminatory conduct within the workplace with the fullest
range of remedial options. See id. at 652, 684 A.2d at 1388-89.
Megan E. Gula

ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW- STATE AGENCY REQUIREMENTS- WITH
THE ISSUANCE OF A PERMIT EXEMPTION FOR A SLUDGE-DERIVED
PRODUCT
SITE,
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION NEED NOT MEET PUBLIC NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
APPLICABLE TO A SOLID WASTE FACILITY, ALTHOUGH AN IMPLIED

DUTY DOES FALL UPON THE AGENCY TO CONSIDER LOCAL
HEALTH AND SAFETY CONCERNS WHEN GRANTING SUCH A PERMIT
EXEMPTION -Holgate Property Assocs. v. Township of Howell,

145 N.J. 590, 679 A.2d 613 (1996).
Holgate Property Associates (Holgate) owned and operated a sand
and gravel quarry in Howell Township, New Jersey.
See Holgate
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Property Assocs. v. Township of Howell, 145 N.J. 590, 593, 679 A.2d
613, 614 (1996). For over ten years Holgate conducted soil removal and
topsoil mixing on the site pursuant to a township permit and ordinance
that allowed the activity as a non-conforming use. A primary operation
of Holgate was to distribute soil to local landfills for fill and reclamation.
See id. at 594, 679 A.2d at 614. In 1989, Holgate received composted
sludge from Philadelphia, which was to be used to replenish and
condition the soil on its Howell Township property. The Department of
Environmental Protection (DEP) granted Holgate authorization for the
project in the form of a permit exception, and notification was sent to
Howell Township (Township) at that time.
On February 26, 1991, the DEP granted two permits to the
Middlesex County Utilities Authority (MCUA):
one allowed for
distribution of sludge derived products (SDP), and the other permitted
storage of the SDP at the Holgate property "for the Distribution to
Landscapers and Other End Users." Id. at 594, 679 A.2d at 614. With
the DEP approval provided by the permits, Holgate began transporting
SDP from the MCUA plant. Holgate then commingled the SDP with its
soil and clay and distributed the resulting product to local landfills for the
purpose of fill and reclamation. See id., 679 A.2d at 614-15. Holgate
approximated that this procedure reduced the taxpayers' disposal costs by
ten million dollars. See id., 679 A.2d at 614.
In July 1993, Township residents began to complain about noxious
odors associated with the SDP and claimed that these products were
contaminating nearby streams. See id., 679 A.2d at 615. At the time,
the SDP storage site contained mounds measuring eighty feet high and
twenty feet wide. The Township scheduled a meeting with Holgate for
August 9, 1993 to address these concerns. Ten minutes before this
meeting was to commence, the Township issued Holgate a "Stop Work
Order," requiring the company to seek an interpretation and/or a use
variance from the zoning board within ten days. See id. at 594-95, 679
A.2d at 615. Nine days later Holgate applied for an interpretation, and a
hearing was set for September 21, 1993. See id. at 595, 679 A.2d at
615. On September 20, 1993, Holgate sought to enjoin the "Stop Work
Order," and pressed for a declaratory judgment that the Solid Waste
Management Act (SWMA) usurped Township zoning and soil removal
ordinances.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, concluded that the
SWMA generally preempts local government regulation because it is a
comprehensive regulatory and statutory scheme. See id. at 595-96, 679
A.2d at 615. In analyzing the regulatory action with respect to sludge
and SDP, the law division remarked that the SWMA grants responsibility

1997]

SURVEY

for the management of this matter to the district level plans, the
"Statewide Sludge Management Plan" (SSMP), and the permit process.
See id. at 595, 679 A.2d at 615. The court noted that the permit process
was consistent with the DEP's goal of turning sludge into useful
fertilizer. See id. The court concluded that the "Stop Work Order"
conflicted with legislative goals and the statewide objective of sludge
management, and was therefore preempted. See id. at 596, 679 A.2d at
615.
The Township appealed, and the New Jersey Superior Court,
Appellate Division, reversed. See id. The issue on appeal was the
procedural requirements that the DEP must fulfill before preemptive
effect over local zoning laws would be granted to its decisions on SDP
sites. See id. The appellate court found that management of SDP was
analogous to management of solid waste. See id. The appellate division
noted that the SWMA could not be given preemptive effect in solid waste
applications without the adoption of a district plan, which would include
public hearings and comments. See id., 679 A.2d at 616. Therefore, the
court opined that the DEP, although vested with power in the absence of
such a district plan to approve an SDP processing site, could not preempt
local ordinances without complying with the public hearing requirement.
See id. at 596-97, 679 A.2d at 616.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted Holgate's petition for
certification, in which the DEP joined. See id. at 597, 679 A.2d at 616.
The court held that the approval of a permit exemption for the operation
of an SDP site would not require the same specific, public-notice
procedures required under the SWMA for approval of a solid waste
facility. See id. at 600, 679 A.2d at 617. Considering state public
policy, the court concluded that the DEP, in exempting an SDP site from
a formal permit requirement, has an implied duty to consider municipal
ordinances and address concerns. See id. at 601, 679 A.2d at 618.
Justice Handler, writing for a unanimous court, began by discussing
the importance that the legislature placed on its statewide management of
solid waste, as evidenced by the SWMA. See id. at 597, 679 A.2d at
616.
The justice stressed, however, that the legislature required
maximum participation at the local level given the impact of these statelevel decisions. See id. According to the court, this participation would
primarily be accomplished through local waste districts, public hearings,
and consultation with local health and safety officials. See id.
Next, the justice noted that the DEP is primarily responsible for the
regulation of solid waste in New Jersey. See id. at 598, 679 A.2d at
616. Examining the SWMA as it pertained to sludge, the court discussed
the legislature's expectation that sludge be converted into beneficial
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products with no injurious effects on the environment. See id. The court
reasoned that the DEP was encouraged to utilize and incorporate sludge
technologies in its statewide plans.
See id. Concluding that the
legislature deemed SDP beneficial, the court pronounced that SDP would
not be subject to extensive regulation. See id. at 599, 679 A.2d at 617.
Thus, the justice reaffirmed that a permit would be required for any
locale handling, storing, or disposing of SDP. See id. Finally, Justice
Handler remarked that the appellate division misconstrued the differences
between "sludge derived products" and "sludge" and thus did not
recognize either the appropriate statutory treatment of sludge under the
SWMA, or the legislature's encouragement of conversion of sludge into
useful and valuable SDP. See id.
In reversing the appellate division, Justice Handler found that
deference should be granted to the DEP on the regulation of SDP, given
its expertise in the area. See id. at 600, 679 A.2d at 617-18. Affording
deference to the DEP, the court held that the granting of a permit
exemption need not involve the required formal notice and/or public
hearings as denoted by the SWMA for solid waste sites because these
requirements would create unnecessary and substantial difficulties in the
creation and regulation of the over one hundred SDP sites. See id. at
600-01, 679 A.2d at 618. Justice Handler, however, realized the
potential for abuse of discretion if the DEP were to fail to consider local
safety and health concerns, zoning laws, and municipal regulations. See
id. at 601, 679 A.2d at 618. Regarding this concern, the court held that
the DEP had an implied duty to consider these factors, although no such
action was articulated in the statute. See id.
The court remarked that a state administrative agency may have an
implied duty to give the public notice where the exercise of the agency's
authority impacts a certain locality and its citizens. See id. Finding that
the "'government has an overriding obligation to deal forthrightly and
fairly with property owners," the court reasoned that this general sense
of fairness requires notice. Id. at 602, 679 A.2d at 618 (quoting Citizens
for Equity v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 126 N.J. 391, 397, 599
A.2d 507, 510 (1991)). The justice also explained that although the
legislature grants ultimate authority to a state agency, it does so with the
intention that the agency will exercise due regard for local matters. See
id. Special consideration, according to the court, should be placed on
local zoning ordinances by the agency to "'flesh[ ] out the impact of the
proposed facility upon neighboring land uses."' Id. at 602-03, 679 A.2d
at 618-19 (quoting Garden State Farms, Inc. v. Bay, 77 N.J. 439, 455,
390 A.2d 1177, 1185 (1978)).
Examining the language of the SWMA, the court reiterated that in
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exempting SDP sites from permit requirements, public policy requires
that the DEP consider local concerns, and that the DEP should notify
affected municipalities. See id. at 603, 679 A.2d at 619. The justice
acknowledged that the notice need not be in the form of a plenary or
public hearing; rather, the requirement could be met if the municipality
and the public were contacted and given a chance to articulate their
opinions on the proposed site. See id. The court found that a failure to
give notice would be an abuse of discretion. See id. Lastly, Justice
Handler declared that the court would not give the ruling retroactive
effect in light of the burdensome impact it would place upon the DEP.
See id. at 604, 679 A.2d at 619.
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Hern emphasized that the
exclusive authority granted to the DEP over SDP would not permit the
state agency to change existing non-SDP uses into SDP uses. See id.
(O'Hern, J., concurring). Rather, the justice explicated, the scheme only
applies if such related SDP uses, such as gravel pits or quarries, already
existed in the community. See id. If such SDP related uses were not
permitted by local ordinance or zoning law, according to Justice O'Hern,
the community could object, and a DEP ruling allowing such a use would
constitute an abuse of discretion. See id., 679 A.2d at 619-20 (O'Hern,
J., concurring).
In granting an implied duty to the DEP to realize and appreciate
local and municipal concerns, the court struck an appropriate and
effective balance in regulating a state agency. The court also adhered to
a sense of fairness and equity, while still allowing and encouraging a
progressive approach to the handling and processing of useless sludge
into useful products and energy. Vital to its reasoning was a legislative
policy to "provide citizens and municipalities with opportunities to
contribute to the development and implementation of solid waste
managementplans." Id. at 603, 679 A.2d at 619 (emphasis added). It is
the fine line that the court coordinated between not over-regulating the
SDP industry and keeping local governments and citizens involved that
should be lauded and deliberated when considering any future concerns
between the state and local entities involved in this potentially odorous
and onerous conflict.
Maurice Kirchofer III
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UDGES-M UNICIPAL COURT JUDGE

VIOLATED TWO CANONS OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT BY

APPEARING ON TELEVISION TO COMMENT ON CASES PENDING IN
OTHER JURISDICTIONS- In re Broadbelt, 146 N.J. 501, 683 A.2d

543 (1996).
Since 1992, Municipal Court Judge Evan W. Broadbelt has
appeared more than fifty times as a guest commentator on "Court TV."
See In re Broadbelt, 146 N.J. 501, 505, 683 A.2d 543, 544 (1996). In
addition, the judge has made three appearances on CNBC since
November 1994 to comment on O.J. Simpson's criminal trial. See id.,
683 A.2d at 544-45 (referring to People v. Simpson, No. BA097211
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1995)). Once, in 1994, Judge Broadbelt discussed
municipal court jurisdiction and procedures on a local television
program. See id., 683 A.2d at 545. The judge was not compensated for
his participation on and involvement with any of these television shows.
Judge Broadbelt is considered a well-respected member of the municipal
judiciary, and has served since 1982 as the municipal court judge for five
municipalities in Ocean and Monmouth counties.
In December 1994, Assignment Judge Lawrence M. Lawson asked
that municipal court judges inform the Assignment Judge prior to making
television appearances.
Judge Lawson twice gave Judge Broadbelt
permission to appear on the live television program hosted by Geraldo
Rivera, but he withdrew that approval in March 1995. In addition, Judge
Lawson requested that Judge Broadbelt decline to make any more
television appearances, a decision with which Judge Broadbelt disagreed.
Judge Lawson then referred the matter to the New Jersey Advisory
Committee on Extrajudicial Activities (Advisory Committee). See id.
The Advisory Committee concluded that Judge Broadbelt's television
appearances violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct (Code) and
Guideline IV.C. 1. of the Guidelines for Extrajudicial Activities for New
Jersey Judges. See id. at 505-06, 683 A.2d at 545. Judge Broadbelt
appealed the Advisory Committee's decision. See id. at 505, 683 A.2d at
544.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted the judge's petition for
review. See id. The court affirmed and modified the opinion of the
Advisory Committee, holding that Judge Broadbelt's television
appearances violated Canon 3A(8) of the Code, which forbids judges
from publicly commenting about pending or impending court
proceedings, and Canon 2B, which prohibits judges from lending the
prestige of their office to advance private interests of others. See id. at
506, 512, 520, 683 A.2d at 545, 548, 552. Furthermore, the court held
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that the restrictions placed upon a judge's freedom of speech by these
canons do not violate the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution. See id. at 519-20, 683 A.2d at 552.
In a per curiam opinion, the court began its analysis by commenting
on the importance of the Code and its canons, as well as the novelty of
the issues presented in this case. See id. at 505, 506, 683 A.2d at 544,
545. The court explained that the canons provide judges with guidance
on how to conduct themselves in order to both preserve the judiciary's
integrity and foster the public's confidence in judicial integrity. See id.
at 506, 683 A.2d at 545. Although the court concluded that Judge
Broadbelt's conduct was in violation of Canons 3A(8) and 2B, the court
observed that sufficient guidance concerning television appearances by
judges may not have been available prior to the instant decision. See id.
The court first considered whether Judge Broadbelt's television
appearances and discussion violated Canon 3A(8), which mandates
impartial and diligent performance of judicial duties and states that judges
"should abstain from public comment about a pending or impending
proceeding in any court." Id. (quoting Code of Judicial Conduct Canon
3A(8)). The court was unpersuaded by Judge Broadbelt's contention that
Canon 3A(8) was inapplicable because the conduct at issue was
extrajudicial. See id. at 507, 683 A.2d at 545. The court declared that
the canon, which specifically notes that it "does not prohibit judges from
making public statements in the course of their official duties[,]" applies
not only to public statements made while a judge is performing official
judicial duties, but also to extrajudicial statements. See id., 683 A.2d at
545-46 (quoting Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3A(8)).
The court also rejected Judge Broadbelt's argument that Guideline
III.A.5.a, which confines the ban on public comment concerning pending
cases to New Jersey cases, shielded the judge from the mandate of Canon
3A(8). See id., 683 A.2d at 546. Instead, the court broadly interpreted
Canon 3A(8)'s reference to "any court" to mean "any court in any
jurisdiction," and noted that the guidelines were not intended to
supersede or modify the Code. See id. at 507-08, 683 A.2d at 546. To
eliminate the discrepancy, the court instructed the Advisory Committee to
rework Guideline III.A.5. so that it conformed with Canon 3A(8). See
id.at 511, 683 A.2d at 548.
Noting that the canon does not prevent a judge from making
remarks or assertions while carrying out his judicial duties, the court
discussed in detail the types of statements that would and would not
violate Canon 3A(8). See id. at 508-11, 683 A.2d at 546-48. For
example, the court stated that under the Canon, a judge would be allowed
to comment on court procedure and discuss cases that are no longer
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pending. See id. at 508, 683 A.2d at 546. The court observed that the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that it is not a
violation of the Canon when a judge, in speaking to the media regarding
a pending case, merely restates what he has said in open court. See id.
(citing United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 946 F.2d 180, 184-85 (2d
Cir. 1991)).
To more clearly distinguish the "fine line" between permissible
commentary and improper statements under Canon 3A(8), the court
looked to the decisions of several other jurisdictions. See id. at 508-11,
683 A.2d at 546-48. First, the court reviewed the decision in Papa v.
New Haven Federation of Teachers, which proffered that "not all public
comments made about a pending case will be improper." Id. at 508, 683
A.2d at 546 (citing Papa v. New Haven Fed'n of Teachers, 444 A.2d
196, 208 (Conn. 1982)). The court also found relevant the Alabama
Supreme Court's decision in In re Sheffield. See id. (citing In re
Sheffield, 465 So. 2d 350 (Ala. 1984)). The court observed that Sheffield
involved an instruction by the Alabama court that judges should
encourage the news media to ask for background information regarding
how the court system functions, and, without commenting on the merits
of cases currently pending, should explain legal terms, procedures,
concepts, and relevant issues so that reporters may intelligently cover a
case. See id. at 508-09, 683 A.2d at 546 (quoting Sheffield, 465 So. 2d
at 355).
The court recounted another tribunal's admonition to a trial judge
who, while a particular case was pending, expressed his opinion to the
media about defense tactics, the relevance of certain evidence, and
whether the defendant should testify. See id. at 509, 683 A.2d at 546-47
(citing United States v. Garwood, 16 M.J. 863, 868-69 (N-M.C.M.R.
Such behavior, the court
1983), aff'd, 20 M.J. 148 (C.M.A.)).
court
to be "inexcusable," and
reiterated, was found by the reviewing
crossed the line between allowable and prohibited commentary. See id.,
683 A.2d at 547.
The court also reported a case in which a judge, who, after a case
was remanded, wrote a letter to the editor of a newspaper in defense of
sentences he imposed, was found to have clearly and impermissibly
exhibited judicial bias. See id. (citing In re Benoit, 523 A.2d 1381,
1382-83 (Me. 1987)). The court recounted another judge's violative acts,
which consisted of speaking about a draft opinion with the media prior to
informing the parties of the decision, commenting to the media about a
pending contempt order, and discussing other pending matters with the
press, including authoring a letter to a newspaper explaining the sentence
imposed by him in a particular matter. See id. at 509-10, 683 A.2d at
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547. The court then looked to the New York Advisory Committee on
Judicial Ethics for guidance, noting that the committee had objected to a
judge's appearances on "Court TV" to speak about cases pending in
other states. See id. at 510, 683 A.2d at 547.
To conclude the discussion of Canon 3A(8), the court turned to New
Jersey policy and addressed the Advisory Committee's recommendations.
See id. at 510-11, 683 A.2d at 547-48. New Jersey, the court noted, had
previously advised judges not to participate in symposia or seminars that
were based on pending cases, because the character of such discussions
could "'expose the judge to the hazard of ... commenting on the issues
[in the pending case]."' Id. at 510, 683 A.2d at 547 (quoting Adv.
Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 1-89 (1989); Adv. Comm. on Judicial
Ethics, Op. 3-88 (1988)). Additionally, the court noted, the Advisory
Committee cautioned judges who preside over death penalty cases not to
participate in seminars on post-conviction issues pertaining to pending
capital cases. See id. at 510-11, 683 A.2d at 547.
Finding the canon to be clear and free from ambiguity, the court
concluded that judges should not comment on cases pending in any
jurisdiction, as doing so would undermine the public's confidence in the
integrity of the judiciary without regard to jurisdictional boundaries. See
id. at 511, 683 A.2d at 548. The court, therefore, held that Judge
Broadbelt's commentaries on "Court TV" and Geraldo Rivera's live
program regarding pending cases were violative of Canon 3A(8). See id.
In the next section of the opinion, the court analyzed whether Judge
Broadbelt's actions also violated Canon 2B. See id. at 512-16, 683 A.2d
at 548-50. This canon, the court explained, prohibits a judge from
"'lend[ing] the prestige of office to advance the private interests of
others . .. [,]"' a mandate similar to that of Guideline IV.C.I., upon
which the Advisory Committee had based its decision. Id. at 512 & n.2,
683 A.2d at 548 & n.2. The court recited the comment to Canon 2B,
which provides that the purpose of the rule is to maintain public
confidence in judicial officers by avoiding actual and apparent
impropriety, even though this means that a judge will be subject to
"constant public scrutiny." See id. at 512, 683 A.2d at 548.
Commenting that New Jersey case law had not yet directly
addressed the issue, the court first examined Judge Broadbelt's argument
that his television appearances were neither controlled by nor in violation
of Canon 2B. See id. at 512-16, 683 A.2d at 548-50. The court engaged
in an analysis of New Jersey decisions concerning other violations of
Canon 2. See id. at 512-13, 683 A.2d at 548-49. The court revealed
that in an earlier decision, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a
municipal court judge who telephoned another municipal court judge to
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discuss a client's arrest violated Canon 2. See id. at 512, 683 A.2d at
548. The court continued that another judge violated the Canon by
attending a picnic given by a convicted felon. See id. at 513, 683 A.2d
at 549. These cases, the court proffered, illustrate the principles that
judges must: (1) avoid conveying the impression that they are "in a
special position to exert influence"; and (2) "be diligent to ensure that
their conduct does not create the appearance of impropriety." Id. at 51213, 683 A.2d at 548-49.
The court found that the propriety of written commentary, as
opposed to television appearances, had previously been addressed in New
Jersey with respect to Canon 2. See id. at 513-14, 683 A.2d at 549. The
Advisory Committee, the court explained, had established Guideline
III.C, which forbids a judge from receiving compensation for written
material appearing in commercial, law-related publications. See id. The
court recited the Advisory Committee's reasoning, which expressed
concern that if a judge were to publish personal views on the state of the
law, and an attorney were to repeat those views back to the judge in an
adversary proceeding, then the opposing party in that proceeding might
believe it futile to advance a contrary argument. See id.
The American Bar Association (ABA), the court discovered, had
opined in 1961 that Canon 2B prohibits judges from being featured on
commercial television shows that simulate or recreate court proceedings.
See id. at 514, 683 A.2d at 549. The court noted that later that same
year, however, the ABA approved a judge's presence and participation
on "Meet the Press."
See id. The court observed that the ABA
reasoned that the show dealt with matters of public interest and that "the
nature of the program and the nature of the appearance of the . . . judge
on it [was] the important thing," regardless of whether the program was
commercially sponsored. Id. (quoting ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics, Informal Op. C-230(g) (1961)).
In 1991, the Broadbelt court noted, the South Carolina Advisory
Committee on Standards of Judicial Conduct held that Canon 2 forbade a
judge from responding to inquiries on a radio talk show. See id. The
court proclaimed that the South Carolina committee was concerned that
the judge's regular spot on the radio show would advance the private
interests of the station because the public perceived the judge to be an
expert on the legal matters being discussed. See id., 683 A.2d at 549-50.
After considering the existing body of law in this area, the court
concluded that several factors must be taken into account to determine
whether a judge's appearance on a television show violates Canon 2B by
lending the prestige of judicial office to that program. See id. at 515,
683 A.2d at 550. These factors, the court announced, consist of: (1) the
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frequency of the judge's appearances; (2) the program's intended
audience; (3) the subject matter of the program; and (4) whether the show
is commercial or non-commercial in nature. See id. As a general rule,
the court cautioned, judges should not appear on any program where the
judge's association with the program could compromise the integrity and
independence of the judiciary. See id. In Judge Broadbelt's situation,
the court determined that the judge violated Canon 2B because the
frequency of Judge Broadbelt's appearances caused the judge to become
regularly identified with the show, "thereby lending it the prestige of his
judicial office." Id.
The court then identified instances where a judge's appearance on
commercial television would not violate the rule. See id. The court
suggested that a single appearance to comment about general procedural
issues, for example, might be permissible. See id. Conversely, the court
explained, a judge's regular appearance even on a non-commercial
program to discuss recent New Jersey decisions would be improper. See
id. The court concluded its discussion of Canon 2B by admitting that
this is an evolving issue, the outer limits of which are not yet set. See id.
The court urged "exceptional caution and discretion," and anticipated
that the Advisory Committee would formulate standards to govern future
appearances. See id. at 515-16, 683 A.2d at 550.
The court next addressed Judge Broadbelt's argument that Canon 4,
which permits certain extrajudicial activity, governed and allowed the
judge's extrajudicial appearances. See id. at 516, 683 A.2d at 550. The
court set forth the text of Canon 4, which provides:
A judge, subject to the proper performance of judicial duties, may

engage in the following quasi-judicial activities if in doing so the
judge does not cast doubt on the judge's capacity to decide impartially

any issue that may come before the court and provided the judge is
not compensated therefor:
A. A judge may speak, write, lecture, and participate in other
activities concerning the law, the legal system, and the administration

of justice.
B. A judge may teach concerning the law, the legal system, and the

administration of justice.
Id. Specifically, the court examined whether Judge Broadbelt's
television appearances were permissible under Canon 4 because they
constituted teaching the public about the judicial system. See id. (quoting
Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 4).
The court disagreed with this contention and asserted that "Canon 4
does not excuse the violations of other canons." Id. The court found
relevant the opinion of the New York Advisory Committee on Judicial
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Ethics that even though a judge's comments regarding a pending case
may possess educational value pursuant to Canon 4, they are forbidden
nevertheless if they violate another canon. See id. The court concluded,
therefore, that Judge Broadbelt's commentary, although informative,
educational, and apparently authorized by Canon 4, remained
inappropriate because it also violated Canons 3A(8) and 2B. See id. at
516-17, 683 A.2d at 551.
As a final issue, the court addressed the constitutionality of the
restrictions placed by the canons on a judge's First Amendment right to
freedom of speech. See id. at 517, 683 A.2d at 551. The court conceded
that "[a] judge does not relinquish his or her First Amendment rights on
ascending to the bench." Id. The court continued, however, noting that
certain limitations may be imposed upon a judge's First Amendment
rights. See id. To analyze the judge's constitutional right to speak
freely, the court examined various tests used by courts and advocated by
commentators. See id. at 517-19, 683 A.2d at 551-52.
First, the court considered the "Pickering public employee
balancing test." See id. at 517, 683 A.2d at 551. The court described
this two-part test, which first examines whether the speech addresses "a
matter of legitimate public concern," and then balances the public
employee's right to freedom of speech against "the public employer's
interest in regulating the speech to promote the efficiency of the public
services it performs." Id. at 517-18, 683 A.2d at 551.
Next, the court briefly noted that other courts use a strict-scrutiny
test to resolve the constitutionality issue. See id. at 518, 683 A.2d at
551. Under this test, the court explained, regulations that attempt to
limit a judge's right to freedom of speech must be "narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling governmental interest," and must use "the least
restrictive means available to achieve that interest." Id.
The court then took notice of a test used by two states, Florida and
West Virginia, known as a "hybrid Pickering/strict-scrutiny test." See
id. This two-pronged test, the court elaborated, asks first "whether the
state could accomplish its legitimate interest in restraining a judge's
speech through narrowly-tailored limitations," and then "whether the
regulation exceeded that which is necessary to accomplish the state's
interests." Id. The court revealed that under this analysis, the West
Virginia Supreme Court held that Canons 1, 2, and 3 did not violate the
First Amendment. See id.
According to the Supreme Court of New Jersey, this State's courts
have applied a "middle-tier scrutiny test," to analyze the regulation of
attorney speech concerning pending cases. See id., 683 A.2d at 551-52.
This two-part test, the court explained, provides that "a regulation will
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be found constitutional if it: (1) 'further[s] an important or substantial
governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression'; and (2)
is no more restrictive than necessary to protect the governmental interest
involved." Id. at 519, 683 A.2d at 552 (quoting In re Hinds, 90 N.J.
604, 614, 449 A.2d 483, 488-89 (1982)). The court announced that the
Hinds middle-tier scrutiny test was adopted by the United States Supreme
Court in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, where the Supreme Court
concluded that a state could regulate an attorney's speech where that
speech created a "'substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing [an
adjudicatory] proceeding."' Id. (quoting Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,
510 U.S 1030, 1075-76 (1991)). The Broadbelt court recalled that in
Hinds, the New Jersey Supreme Court applied this test and determined
that a disciplinary rule prohibiting an attorney from commenting about a
pending case was not violative of the First Amendment. See id. at 519,
683 A.2d at 552.
The court opined that although it would find the restrictions placed
on a judge's right to free speech constitutional under any of the four
standards outlined above, the "Gentile/Hinds" standard is the most
appropriate. See id. Under this standard, the court continued, "the
regulation of a judge's speech will be upheld if it furthers a substantial
governmental interest unrelated to suppression of expression, and is no
more restrictive than necessary." Id. The court proffered that avoiding
material bias to an adjudicatory proceeding is just one example of a
governmental interest adequate to uphold limitations on a judge's speech.
See id. In conclusion, the supreme court rejected Judge Broadbelt's
constitutional argument and held that the interests inherent in Canons
3A(8) and 2B, which seek to maintain the public's confidence in the
judiciary and preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary, are
sufficient to uphold the restrictions placed upon a judge's speech by those
canons. See id. at 519-20, 683 A.2d at 552.
At the outset of' the analysis, New Jersey's highest court admitted
that prior to the decision in Broadbelt, guidance regarding television
appearances may not have been available for New Jersey judges. See id.
at 506, 683 A.2d at 545. After this opinion, judges now have the
following rules to guide them: (1) Canon 3A(8) prohibits judges from
commenting on a case pending in any jurisdiction; and (2) Canon 2B
forbids judges from lending the prestige of their offices to a television
program.
The first prohibition is clear and should provide adequate guidance
for judges who are considering television appearances. Judges simply
must not comment on a case pending in any jurisdiction. Merely
ascertaining the status of the case allows judges to comply with this
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bright-line rule.
The second command, however, does not provide the same clear-cut
guidance to New Jersey judges. Instead, the court articulated a multifactored test to determine whether appearances by judges on television
programs lends the prestige of their offices to those programs. Then, the
court announced a vague generalization and gave two examples of
permissible behavior and one example of activity that would violate the
rule. The court explained that it "need not" attempt to prescribe more
precise standards at this point in time because the court's "experience is
evolving" in this area. Instead, the court left it to the Advisory
Committee to formulate more precise standards. For the time being,
however, with respect to television appearances that may violate Canon
2B, judges in New Jersey remain without the guidance that the court
recognized was not available for Judge Broadbelt.
Christine Kormanik

CRIMINAL LAW- PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION-A PROSECUTOR'S
DECISION TO DENY A DEFENDANT'S APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION
INTO A PRE-TRIAL INTERVENTION PROGRAM WILL BE DISTURBED
ONLY
UPON
A
COURT'S
FINDING
OF
ARBITRARINESS,
IRRATIONALITY, OR SOME OTHER ABUSE OF DISCRETION-State v.

Wallace, 146 N.J. 576, 684 A.2d 1355 (1996).
In January 1993, Bruce Wallace, a lawyer and Cherry Hill
councilman, informed Paula Stewart, his former girlfriend, that he was
contemplating making an appointment with her new boyfriend to cut the
man's throat. See State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576, 579-80, 684 A.2d
1355, 1356-57 (1996). According to Stewart's subsequent report to the
local police, Wallace had been issuing threats to Stewart's new boyfriend
on a consistent basis. See id. at 580, 684 A.2d at 1357. In April 1993,
Wallace's psychiatrist attempted to contact Stewart by telephone on
several occasions. The doctor believed that Wallace intended to inflict
harm upon either Stewart's property or Stewart herself. When these
efforts to reach Stewart proved unsuccessful, the doctor notified the local
police.
On the morning of June 5, 1993, Wallace arrived at Stewart's home
carrying a loaded handgun. See id., 684 A.2d at 1356. As Stewart
prepared to leave for an appointment, Wallace produced his weapon and
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told Stewart that he had come to murder her and then kill himself. See
id. at 579-80, 684 A.2d at 1356-57. Wallace then became highly
emotional and realized that he was unable to actually carry out his
intentions. See id. at 580, 684 A.2d at 1357. Without ever aiming the
loaded gun at Stewart, Wallace unloaded the weapon and placed it aside.
Stewart filed a report of the handgun incident with the Voorhees
Township Police Department, and Wallace was arrested on June 8, 1993.
The charges against Wallace consisted of "second degree possession of a
firearm for an unlawful purpose ... and third degree making of
Initially, bail was set at $20,000, but was later
terroristic threats."
modified when Wallace was admitted for immediate inpatient psychiatric
medical care at Hampton Hospital. The doctors diagnosed Wallace with
After
major depression accompanied by biochemical deficiencies.
remaining in the hospital for the three weeks subsequent to his arrest,
Wallace was released to Dr. Jeffrey Greenbarg for follow-up care.
In July 1993, Wallace's request to the police for the return of his
two weapons, seized at the time of his arrest, was denied. Shortly
thereafter, in September 1993, Wallace submitted an application for
admission into the pre-trial intervention program (PTI) in Camden
County. See id. at 581, 684 A.2d at 1357. Eleven days after his
application was filed, an assistant prosecutor for Camden County notified
Wallace's attorney that the application was rejected. Displeased with the
denial of his PTI application, Wallace appealed the prosecutor's
determination to the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division. See id.
Upon review, the trial court found that Wallace failed to demonstrate that
the prosecutor acted in a way evidencing a "patent and gross abuse of
discretion," and thus denied Wallace's motion. See id.
Wallace subsequently pled guilty to a violation of N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:39-5b, which makes the possession of a gun without a permit a
third-degree offense. See id. Pursuant to his pleading, the court
sentenced Wallace to a three-year probationary period that included, inter
alia, community service, continued psychiatric evaluation and/or
treatment, relinquishment of his city council seat, and a fine. See id. At
this time, Wallace reserved the right to appeal the prosecutor's rejection
of his request for admission into the PTI program. See id. Wallace then
appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to appeal. See id. The
New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed the lower
court's denial of the motion and remanded Wallace's matter to the
prosecutor for further consideration. See id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification to consider the
level of deference a court must grant to the discretion exercised by a
prosecutor in deciding whether to dismiss criminal charges against a
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defendant and whether to grant that defendant admission into PTI. See
id. at 579, 581, 684 A.2d at 1356, 1357.
The court specifically
addressed whether the evidence in Wallace's case was sufficient to
uphold the appellate division's finding of arbitrariness, irrationality, or
some other abuse of discretion necessary to question a prosecutor's
rejection of a PTI application. See id. at 585, 684 A.2d at 1359. The
court reversed the judgment of the appellate division, holding that it is a
prosecutor's prerogative to afford serious weight to domestic violence
matters and that the prosecutor in this instance did not commit a clear
error in judgment in her evaluation and balancing of the relevant factors.
See id. at 589-90, 684 A.2d at 1362.
Justice Handler, joined by all of the justices of the court except
Chief Justice Poritz, who did not participate in the decision, authored the
opinion. See id. at 579, 684 A.2d at 1356. Justice Handler began the
opinion by reviewing the discussion of PTI in recent court decisions. See
id. at 581-83, 684 A.2d at 1357-59. The justice observed that PTI is an
alternative to traditional prosecution, in that it diverts to a separate
program those offenders believed to be deterred from further criminal
behavior through early rehabilitation. See id. at 581, 684 A.2d at 1358.
The court reiterated that PTI would benefit the criminal justice system in
those circumstances where prosecution would prove "'ineffective,
counterproductive, or unnecessary.'" See id. Justice Handler explained
that since 1979, a court rule and a statute under the Code of Criminal
Justice, each of which embodies generally the same terms, have
simultaneously governed PTI in New Jersey. See id. at 582, 684 A.2d at
1358.
The justice emphasized that since the genesis of the state's PTI
program, placing an offender into the program has been a
"quintessentially prosecutorial function." See id. The court noted that
although the prosecutor possesses great discretion in deciding which
individuals will be admitted into alternative programs and which will be
prosecuted, this discretion is not without limits. See id. Justice Handler
elaborated that a court reviewing a prosecutor's denial of a PTI
application holds the authority to overrule the prosecutor and order the
offender to be admitted into PTI, but only when the offender can
establish, clearly and convincingly, that the prosecutor's denial of the
application was grounded in a "patent and gross abuse of discretion."
See id. The court explained that judicial intervention is the only way to
accomplish justice and fundamental fairness if a prosecutor's decision
significantly strayed from the goals sought to be achieved through PTI.
See id. at 582-83, 684 A.2d at 1358.
The court then reviewed an earlier decision by the New Jersey
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Supreme Court setting forth those situations equating to an abuse of
discretion. See id. at 583, 684 A.2d at 1358. Justice Handler detailed
that these situations consisted of circumstances where a prosecutor's
refusal: (1) was not based upon consideration of the entire set of relevant
factors; (2) was premised upon an analysis of inappropriate or irrelevant
factors; or (3) constituted a clear error in judgment. See id. To be
"patent and gross," the justice continued, the challenged prosecutorial
decision must be shown to "clearly subvert" the purposes of PTI. See
id. Justice Handler noted that a reviewing court could either remand a
matter to the prosecutor for reconsideration or directly order an
offender's admission into PTI. See id. The justice commented that
remand is appropriate when a prosecutor's decision is found to be
"arbitrary, irrational, or otherwise an abuse of discretion," but does not
rise to the "patent and gross" level, whereas a direct order is appropriate
when a prosecutorial determination, while based on proper factors, was
clearly and convincingly a plain error of judgment. See id. at 583, 684
A.2d at 1358-59.
Next, the court addressed the requirement that a prosecutor provide
an offender with a statement of the grounds upon which the PTI decision
is based. See id. at 584, 684 A.2d at 1359. Justice Handler affirmed the
court's earlier pronouncement that this statement must show that the facts
have been carefully evaluated by the prosecutor, with attention to the
pertinent law. See id. The justice further noted that such a statement
serves a number of purposes, such as allowing the offender to formulate
a response dispelling questions of arbitrariness, protecting the prosecutor
from the temptation of considering inappropriate factors, and preventing
poorly-reasoned decisions by requiring that thought processes be
recorded. See id. The court emphasized that there is a presumption,
albeit rebuttable, that a prosecutor evaluated all of the relevant factors,
and a court reviewing the prosecutorial decision is, in most
circumstances, limited to the rationale found in the prosecutor's
statement. See id. The justice concluded the general discussion of PTI
decisions by reaffirming the court's historical view that a prosecutorial
decision rejecting a PTI application will be infrequently overruled. See
id.
The court then examined whether enough evidence existed in
Wallace's case to support the requisite finding of arbitrariness,
irrationality, or some other abuse of discretion warranting remand to the
prosecutor for reconsideration. See id. at 585, 684 A.2d at 1359.
Justice Handler explained that the PTI statute enumerated seventeen
factors that a prosecutor should consider when making a PTI decision,
including, inter alia, the specific facts of the situation, the nature of the
offense, whether the offender's act was violent, and whether the
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offender's act constituted a trend toward anti-social behavior. See id.,
684 A.2d at 1359-60. Justice Handler observed that in both the statute
and the court rule, the weight to be assigned to each factor by the
prosecutor is not set forth, thus leading to the conclusion that both
authorities intended to leave the weighing and evaluation process to the
discretion of the prosecutor. See id. The justice cautioned, however,
that prosecutors who so improperly weigh a certain factor as to create a
"clear error in judgment" will be subject to review by the judiciary as a
check on their authority. See id.
The court next addressed the aforementioned standards as applied to
Wallace's case. See id. at 587, 684 A.2d at 1360-61. Justice Handler
disagreed with the appellate division's analysis of the case, noting that it
was not for the lower court to determine that the prosecutor needed to
further examine the facts surrounding Wallace's mental condition or that
she had assigned too-little weight to Wallace's mental state on June 5,
1993. See id. The justice announced that the prosecutor in Wallace's
case clearly had evaluated all of the relevant factors and made a
discretionary decision. See id., 684 A.2d at 1361. In support of this
determination, Justice Handler quoted portions of the prosecutor's letter
of rejection demonstrating that although she acknowledged that Wallace
had a mental condition, the nature of his offense and his instability and
propensity for violence led her to reject his application. See id. at 588,
684 A.2d at 1361.
The court quickly dispensed of Wallace's argument that a court
reviewing a PTI decision should give substantial weight to the fact that a
non-custodial sentence, based upon a negotiated plea and concerns
regarding rehabilitation, was imposed upon the offender following the
denial of his PTI application. See id. at 588-89, 684 A.2d at 1361.
Justice Handler noted that the imposition of this type of sentence in no
way diminishes the prosecutor's reasoning for rejecting the PTI
application. See id. The justice emphasized that to allow such an
argument would greatly inhibit prosecutorial discretion, unfairly impair
an otherwise well-reasoned determination to deny admission into PTI,
and operate to discourage prosecutorial efforts to agree to pleas
negotiated with particular concern to an offender's special circumstances.
See id. at 589, 684 A.2d at 1361.
The court further rebuffed the appellate decision by stating that the
lower court had applied the incorrect level of deference to the
prosecutor's decision. See id., 684 A.2d at 1362. Justice Handler
explained that the appellate court should not have considered Wallace's
case de novo; rather it should have reviewed the case with extreme
See id. The justice
deference to the prosecutor's determination.
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concluded that the assistant prosecutor assigned to Wallace's case failed
to evaluate the factors in a manner constituting a clear error in judgment.
See id. Furthermore, Justice Handler held that it is a prosecutor's
prerogative to afford serious weight to matters of local public concern,
such as the domestic violence in this case. See id. Accordingly, the
justice reversed the judgment of the appellate court. See id. at 589-90,
684 A.2d at 1362.
The New Jersey Supreme Court reached the correct result in this
matter. A prosecutor, through her daily exposure to a wide range of
crimes and offenders, is in the best position to evaluate a situation and
determine the severity and potential for danger inherent therein. With
the recent public concern over incidents of domestic violence and the
brutal nature of many of these occurrences, it is reasonable for the
prosecutors dealing with these offenses to deem the offenders unsuitable
candidates for PTI.
New Jersey originally created PTI programs to provide an
alternative to prosecution in circumstances where it appeared that early
rehabilitation would deter future criminal behavior. See id. at 581, 684
A.2d at 1357-58. In Wallace's case, the incident involving the gun was
not an early indication of violence-Wallace had caused his psychiatrist to
become concerned for the victim's safety in the months prior to the
incident, and had been threatening the victim's new boyfriend for
months. See id., 684 A.2d at 1357. Additionally, Wallace served no jail
time as a result of his plea; rather, he incurred only probation with
specified conditions attached.
See id. at 581, 684 A.2d at 1357.
Although Wallace may have considered the sentence harsh, that is not
nearly enough to challenge the prosecutor's denial of admission into the
PTI program.
It is imperative that courts allow prosecutors the discretion, free
from constant court interference and reversal, to determine the best path
for an offender. Once courts begin the practice of frequently questioning
the overriding prosecutorial discretion, the public will start to doubt the
judgment and abilities of those individuals-the prosecutors---charged with
enforcing the laws and punishing those people who violate the laws. The
negative public view, rather than allowing the resources of New Jersey's
criminal justice system to be used in a way most beneficial to society,
will serve only to weaken the state's system-a result that will harm
everyone, even Bruce Wallace.
DebraM. WaUin

